Statistical uncertainty and coarse contracts

DOI10.1016/J.JET.2024.105876MaRDI QIDQ6604764zbMATH OpenFDO

Authors Justin Burkett, Maxwell Rosenthal

Publication date 13 September 2024

Published in Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

zbMATH Keywords

uncertaintyincomplete preferencesmoral hazarddata driven contract design

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Contract theory (moral hazard, adverse selection) (91B41) Principal-agent models (91B43)

Recommendations

• Knightian uncertainty and moral hazard
• The principal-agent problem with smooth ambiguity
• Moral hazard under ambiguity
• Contracting under uncertainty: a principal-agent model with ambiguity averse parties
• Locally robust contracts for moral hazard

Cites work

• Aggregation and Linearity in the Provision of Intertemporal Incentives
• An Analysis of the Principal-Agent Problem
• Calibrated incentive contracts
• Decision Makers as Statisticians: Diversity, Ambiguity, and Learning
• Knightian uncertainty and moral hazard
• Locally robust contracts for moral hazard
• Optimal Monitoring Design
• Probability Inequalities for Sums of Bounded Random Variables
• Robust Incentives for Teams

Cited in

(2)

• Data-driven contract design
• Robust dynamic contracts with multiple agents

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