Statistical uncertainty and coarse contracts

DOI10.1016/J.JET.2024.105876zbMATH Open1544.91178MaRDI QIDQ6604764FDOQ6604764

Authors: Justin Burkett, Maxwell Rosenthal 

Publication date: 13 September 2024

Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Recommendations

• Knightian uncertainty and moral hazard
• The principal-agent problem with smooth ambiguity
• Moral hazard under ambiguity
• Contracting under uncertainty: a principal-agent model with ambiguity averse parties
• Locally robust contracts for moral hazard

zbMATH Keywords

uncertaintyincomplete preferencesmoral hazarddata driven contract design

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Contract theory (moral hazard, adverse selection) (91B41) Principal-agent models (91B43)

Cites Work

• Probability Inequalities for Sums of Bounded Random Variables
• An Analysis of the Principal-Agent Problem
• Decision Makers as Statisticians: Diversity, Ambiguity, and Learning
• Calibrated incentive contracts
• Aggregation and Linearity in the Provision of Intertemporal Incentives
• Knightian uncertainty and moral hazard
• Locally robust contracts for moral hazard
• Optimal Monitoring Design
• Robust Incentives for Teams

Cited In (2)

• Data-driven contract design
• Robust dynamic contracts with multiple agents

This page was built for publication: Statistical uncertainty and coarse contracts

Report a bug (only for logged in users!)Click here to report a bug for this page (MaRDI item Q6604764)