Locally robust contracts for moral hazard

DOI10.1016/J.JMATECO.2015.11.001zbMATH Open1368.91121OpenAlexW2176946348MaRDI QIDQ899499FDOQ899499

Authors: Delong Meng, Gabriel Carroll 

Publication date: 28 December 2015

Published in: Journal of Mathematical Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jmateco.2015.11.001

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zbMATH Keywords

principal-agent problemworst-casecontractlocal robustnessoptimality-robustness tradeoff

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Cites Work

• Calibrated incentive contracts
• Robustness of simple menus of contracts in cost-based procurement
• Subgame-perfect implementation under information perturbations
• Title not available (Why is that?)
• The robustness of robust implementation
• Implementation with Near-Complete Information
• Locally robust implementation and its limits
• Sellers with misspecified models

Cited In (12)

• Robust contracts with one-sided commitment
• Knightian uncertainty and moral hazard
• Robust incentives for risk
• Moral hazard under ambiguity
• Optimal contracts and asset prices in a continuous-time delegated portfolio management problem
• Statistical uncertainty and coarse contracts
• Robustness and approximation for the linear contract design
• A note on robust procurement contracts
• Robust contracting with additive noise
• Robust contract designs: linear contracts and moral hazard
• Randomization is optimal in the robust principal-agent problem
• A general framework for robust contracting models

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