Locally robust contracts for moral hazard

DOI10.1016/J.JMATECO.2015.11.001MaRDI QIDQ899499zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Delong Meng, Gabriel Carroll

Publication date 28 December 2015

Published in Journal of Mathematical Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jmateco.2015.11.001

zbMATH Keywords

principal-agent problemworst-casecontractlocal robustnessoptimality-robustness tradeoff

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Recommendations

• Robust contract designs: linear contracts and moral hazard
• Moral hazard under ambiguity
• Knightian uncertainty and moral hazard
• Robust contracting with additive noise
• Contract theory in a VUCA world

Cites work

• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 4207455 (Why is no real title available?)
• Calibrated incentive contracts
• Implementation with Near-Complete Information
• Locally robust implementation and its limits
• Robustness of simple menus of contracts in cost-based procurement
• Sellers with misspecified models
• Subgame-perfect implementation under information perturbations
• The robustness of robust implementation

Cited in

(12)

• Robustness and approximation for the linear contract design
• A note on robust procurement contracts
• Statistical uncertainty and coarse contracts
• Robust incentives for risk
• Moral hazard under ambiguity
• Knightian uncertainty and moral hazard
• Optimal contracts and asset prices in a continuous-time delegated portfolio management problem
• A general framework for robust contracting models
• Randomization is optimal in the robust principal-agent problem
• Robust contracts with one-sided commitment
• Robust contracting with additive noise
• Robust contract designs: linear contracts and moral hazard

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