Robust contracting with additive noise

DOI10.1016/J.JET.2016.10.002MaRDI QIDQ337835zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Delong Meng, Gabriel Carroll

Publication date 3 November 2016

Published in Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2016.10.002

zbMATH Keywords

robustnessprincipal-agent problemlinear contractworst-case

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Recommendations

• Robust contract designs: linear contracts and moral hazard
• Optimal contracts with a risk-taking agent
• Locally robust contracts for moral hazard
• Noisy Observation in Adverse Selection Models
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Cites work

• Adverse selection under ignorance
• Aggregation and Linearity in the Provision of Intertemporal Incentives
• Calibrated incentive contracts
• Dynamic Security Design: Convergence to Continuous Time and Asset Pricing Implications
• Dynamic managerial compensation: a variational approach
• Foundations of Dominant-Strategy Mechanisms
• Moral hazard, incentive contracts, and risk: evidence from procurement
• Robust contracting under common value uncertainty
• Robustness of simple menus of contracts in cost-based procurement
• Using elasticities to derive optimal income tax rates

Cited in

(10)

• Robust Contracts in Continuous Time
• Salesforce contracting under model uncertainty
• Contracting with moral hazard, adverse selection and risk neutrality: when does one size fit all?
• Relational incentive contracts with productivity shocks
• Robust contracting under double moral hazard
• Locally robust contracts for moral hazard
• A general framework for robust contracting models
• Noisy Observation in Adverse Selection Models
• Optimal contracts with a risk-taking agent
• Robust contract designs: linear contracts and moral hazard

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