Robust contracting with additive noise
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Publication:337835
DOI10.1016/J.JET.2016.10.002zbMATH Open1372.91058OpenAlexW2530734591MaRDI QIDQ337835FDOQ337835
Authors: Delong Meng, Gabriel Carroll 
Publication date: 3 November 2016
Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2016.10.002
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Cites Work
- Foundations of Dominant-Strategy Mechanisms
- Using elasticities to derive optimal income tax rates
- Dynamic Security Design: Convergence to Continuous Time and Asset Pricing Implications
- Adverse selection under ignorance
- Calibrated incentive contracts
- Aggregation and Linearity in the Provision of Intertemporal Incentives
- Moral hazard, incentive contracts, and risk: evidence from procurement
- Robust contracting under common value uncertainty
- Robustness of simple menus of contracts in cost-based procurement
- Dynamic managerial compensation: a variational approach
Cited In (10)
- Noisy Observation in Adverse Selection Models
- Robust Contracts in Continuous Time
- Robust contracting under double moral hazard
- Locally robust contracts for moral hazard
- Relational incentive contracts with productivity shocks
- Optimal contracts with a risk-taking agent
- Robust contract designs: linear contracts and moral hazard
- Salesforce contracting under model uncertainty
- Contracting with moral hazard, adverse selection and risk neutrality: when does one size fit all?
- A general framework for robust contracting models
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