Robust contracting with additive noise

DOI10.1016/j.jet.2016.10.002zbMath1372.91058OpenAlexW2530734591MaRDI QIDQ337835

Delong Meng, Gabriel D. Carroll

Publication date: 3 November 2016

Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2016.10.002

zbMATH Keywords

robustnessprincipal-agent problemworst-caselinear contract

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Related Items (3)

Robust Contract Designs: Linear Contracts and Moral Hazard ⋮ Salesforce contracting under model uncertainty ⋮ Contracting with moral hazard, adverse selection and risk neutrality: when does one size fit all?

Cites Work

• Robustness of simple menus of contracts in cost-based procurement
• Dynamic managerial compensation: a variational approach
• Adverse selection under ignorance
• Using Elasticities to Derive Optimal Income Tax Rates
• Calibrated Incentive Contracts
• Aggregation and Linearity in the Provision of Intertemporal Incentives
• Moral Hazard, Incentive Contracts, and Risk: Evidence from Procurement
• Robust contracting under common value uncertainty
• Dynamic Security Design: Convergence to Continuous Time and Asset Pricing Implications
• Foundations of Dominant-Strategy Mechanisms

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