Using Elasticities to Derive Optimal Income Tax Rates

From MaRDI portal
Publication:2729269

DOI10.1111/1467-937X.00166zbMath0976.91052WikidataQ57408061 ScholiaQ57408061MaRDI QIDQ2729269

Emmanuel Saez

Publication date: 18 July 2001

Published in: The Review of Economic Studies (Search for Journal in Brave)




Related Items (34)

Optimal taxation in the presence of income-dependent relative income effectsOptimal Provision of Public Goods: A Synthesis*Redistribution with labor market frictionsOptimal income taxation with discrete skill distributionRobust contracting with additive noiseOptimal mixed taxation, public goods and the problem of high-skilled emigrationHigher tax for top earnersPersonal income tax reforms: a genetic algorithm approachTax differentiation, lobbying, and welfareOptimal income taxation under monopolistic competitionOptimal redistribution with a shadow economyOptimal redistributive taxation with both extensive and intensive responsesBetter bunching, nicer notchingTax progressivity and the Pareto tail of income distributionsBorda-optimal taxation of labour incomeOptimal tax problems with multidimensional heterogeneity: a mechanism design approachGeneralized compensation principleOn the redistributive power of pensionsSharing the sacrifice, minimizing the pain: optimal wage reductionsShall we keep the highly skilled at home? The optimal income tax perspectiveSharing Profits in the Sharing EconomySustainability with endogenous discounting when utility depends on consumption and amenitiesHigher taxes at the top? The role of tax avoidanceOptimal marginal and average income taxation under maximinOptimal government policies in models with heterogeneous agentsRevisiting the optimal linear income tax with categorical transfersSolving heterogeneous-agent models by projection and perturbationHuman capital and average firm sizeOn optimization of tax functionsOptimal Mirrleesian taxation in non-competitive labor marketsEquity-efficiency implications of a European tax and transfer systemThe human side of mechanism design: a tribute to Leo Hurwicz and Jean-Jacque LaffontWho wins, who loses? Identification of conditional causal effects, and the welfare impact of changing wagesOn the optimal marginal rate of income tax




This page was built for publication: Using Elasticities to Derive Optimal Income Tax Rates