Shall we keep the highly skilled at home? The optimal income tax perspective
From MaRDI portal
Publication:2450144
DOI10.1007/S00355-011-0552-3zbMATH Open1287.91114OpenAlexW2144708083MaRDI QIDQ2450144FDOQ2450144
Authors: Laurent Simula, Alain Trannoy 
Publication date: 16 May 2014
Published in: Social Choice and Welfare (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://www.cesifo.org/DocDL/cesifo1_wp3326.pdf
Recommendations
- Skill distribution and the optimal marginal income tax rate
- On redistributive taxation under the threat of high-skill emigration
- Optimal mixed taxation, public goods and the problem of high-skilled emigration
- Rising skill premium and the dynamics of optimal capital and labor taxation
- Optimal income taxation and job choice
- Optimal income taxation with discrete skill distribution
- On the optimality of optimal income taxation
- Differential taxation and occupational choice
- Using a microeconometric model of household labour supply to design optimal income taxes
- TAXATION AND HUMAN CAPITAL ACCUMULATION
Cites Work
- Title not available (Why is that?)
- Population issues in social choice theory, welfare economics, and ethics.
- Participation constraints in adverse selection models
- Using elasticities to derive optimal income tax rates
- Comparative Static Properties of Optimal Nonlinear Income Taxes
- An Exploration in the Theory of Optimum Income Taxation
- Optimal nonlinear income tax and nonlinear pricing: Optimality conditions and comparative static properties
- Some Properties of the Optimal Income-Tax
- Countervailing incentives in agency problems
- On countervailing incentives
Cited In (7)
- Optimal mixed taxation, public goods and the problem of high-skilled emigration
- Migration, taxation and educational incentives
- Welfare and labor supply implications of tax competition for mobile labor
- Voting over selfishly optimal income tax schedules with tax-driven migrations
- On redistributive taxation under the threat of high-skill emigration
- Strategic nonlinear income tax competition with perfect labor mobility
- Tax me if you can! Optimal nonlinear income tax between competing governments
This page was built for publication: Shall we keep the highly skilled at home? The optimal income tax perspective
Report a bug (only for logged in users!)Click here to report a bug for this page (MaRDI item Q2450144)
