Shall we keep the highly skilled at home? The optimal income tax perspective

DOI10.1007/S00355-011-0552-3MaRDI QIDQ2450144zbMATHOpenAlexFDO

Authors Laurent Simula, Alain Trannoy

Publication date 16 May 2014

Published in Social Choice and Welfare (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://www.cesifo.org/DocDL/cesifo1_wp3326.pdf

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Macroeconomic theory (monetary models, models of taxation) (91B64)

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Cites work

• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3992265 (Why is no real title available?)
• An Exploration in the Theory of Optimum Income Taxation
• Comparative Static Properties of Optimal Nonlinear Income Taxes
• Countervailing incentives in agency problems
• On countervailing incentives
• Optimal nonlinear income tax and nonlinear pricing: Optimality conditions and comparative static properties
• Participation constraints in adverse selection models
• Population issues in social choice theory, welfare economics, and ethics.
• Some Properties of the Optimal Income-Tax
• Using elasticities to derive optimal income tax rates

Cited in

(7)

• Migration, taxation and educational incentives
• Welfare and labor supply implications of tax competition for mobile labor
• Strategic nonlinear income tax competition with perfect labor mobility
• Tax me if you can! Optimal nonlinear income tax between competing governments
• Optimal mixed taxation, public goods and the problem of high-skilled emigration
• Voting over selfishly optimal income tax schedules with tax-driven migrations
• On redistributive taxation under the threat of high-skill emigration

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