Shall we keep the highly skilled at home? The optimal income tax perspective

DOI10.1007/s00355-011-0552-3zbMath1287.91114OpenAlexW2144708083MaRDI QIDQ2450144

Alain Trannoy, Laurent Simula

Publication date: 16 May 2014

Published in: Social Choice and Welfare (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://www.cesifo.org/DocDL/cesifo1_wp3326.pdf

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Macroeconomic theory (monetary models, models of taxation) (91B64)

Related Items (5)

Optimal mixed taxation, public goods and the problem of high-skilled emigration ⋮ Welfare and labor supply implications of tax competition for mobile labor ⋮ Voting over selfishly optimal income tax schedules with tax-driven migrations ⋮ On redistributive taxation under the threat of high-skill emigration ⋮ Strategic nonlinear income tax competition with perfect labor mobility

Cites Work

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• Optimal nonlinear income tax and nonlinear pricing: Optimality conditions and comparative static properties
• Participation constraints in adverse selection models
• Countervailing incentives in agency problems
• On countervailing incentives
• Using Elasticities to Derive Optimal Income Tax Rates
• Comparative Static Properties of Optimal Nonlinear Income Taxes
• Some Properties of the Optimal Income-Tax
• An Exploration in the Theory of Optimum Income Taxation

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