Shall we keep the highly skilled at home? The optimal income tax perspective
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Publication:2450144
DOI10.1007/s00355-011-0552-3zbMath1287.91114OpenAlexW2144708083MaRDI QIDQ2450144
Publication date: 16 May 2014
Published in: Social Choice and Welfare (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://www.cesifo.org/DocDL/cesifo1_wp3326.pdf
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