Strategic nonlinear income tax competition with perfect labor mobility
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Cites work
- An Exploration in the Theory of Optimum Income Taxation
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- Population issues in social choice theory, welfare economics, and ethics.
- Shall we keep the highly skilled at home? The optimal income tax perspective
- The Revelation and Delegation Principles in Common Agency Games
Cited in
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