Strategic nonlinear income tax competition with perfect labor mobility

DOI10.1016/j.geb.2013.08.001zbMath1282.91221OpenAlexW2142937179MaRDI QIDQ2437822

Craig Brett, John A. Weymark, Felix J. Bierbrauer

Publication date: 13 March 2014

Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: http://hdl.handle.net/1803/15830

zbMATH Keywords

optimal income taxationlabor mobilityrace to the bottomincome tax competition

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Macroeconomic theory (monetary models, models of taxation) (91B64) Economic models of real-world systems (e.g., electricity markets, etc.) (91B74)

Related Items

Welfare and labor supply implications of tax competition for mobile labor ⋮ Voting over selfishly optimal income tax schedules with tax-driven migrations ⋮ John A. Weymark ⋮ Meritocracy, egalitarianism and the stability of majoritarian organizations

Cites Work

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• Shall we keep the highly skilled at home? The optimal income tax perspective
• Monopoly Provision of Quality and Warranties: An Exploration in the Theory of Multidimensional Screening
• The Revelation and Delegation Principles in Common Agency Games
• An Exploration in the Theory of Optimum Income Taxation

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