Welfare and labor supply implications of tax competition for mobile labor
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Publication:892856
DOI10.1007/S00355-015-0898-ZzbMATH Open1341.91104OpenAlexW318900731MaRDI QIDQ892856FDOQ892856
Authors: Vilen Lipatov, Alfons J. Weichenrieder
Publication date: 12 November 2015
Published in: Social Choice and Welfare (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00355-015-0898-z
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Cites Work
Cited In (10)
- Vertical transfers and tax competition: does trade integration matter?
- Tax differentiation, lobbying, and welfare
- Fiscal competition and growth when capital is imperfectly mobile
- Mobility and tax competition when wages are endogenously determined
- Does tax competition soften regional budget constraint?
- Tax competition, relative performance, and policy imitation
- A model of tax competition under taxpayers' local competition
- On redistributive taxation under the threat of high-skill emigration
- Strategic nonlinear income tax competition with perfect labor mobility
- Redistribution, Fiscal Competition, and the Politics of Economic Integration
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