Welfare and labor supply implications of tax competition for mobile labor

DOI10.1007/S00355-015-0898-ZMaRDI QIDQ892856zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Vilen Lipatov, Alfons J. Weichenrieder

Publication date 12 November 2015

Published in Social Choice and Welfare (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1007/s00355-015-0898-z

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Macroeconomic theory (monetary models, models of taxation) (91B64)

Recommendations

• Mobility and tax competition when wages are endogenously determined
• Strategic nonlinear income tax competition with perfect labor mobility
• Mobile Labor, Multiple Tax Instruments, and Tax Competition
• Tax competition, relative performance, and policy imitation
• On redistributive taxation under the threat of high-skill emigration

Cites work

• An Exploration in the Theory of Optimum Income Taxation
• Shall we keep the highly skilled at home? The optimal income tax perspective
• Strategic nonlinear income tax competition with perfect labor mobility
• Tax me if you can! Optimal nonlinear income tax between competing governments

Cited in

(10)

• Mobility and tax competition when wages are endogenously determined
• Does tax competition soften regional budget constraint?
• A model of tax competition under taxpayers' local competition
• Tax differentiation, lobbying, and welfare
• Vertical transfers and tax competition: does trade integration matter?
• Tax competition, relative performance, and policy imitation
• Strategic nonlinear income tax competition with perfect labor mobility
• Redistribution, Fiscal Competition, and the Politics of Economic Integration
• On redistributive taxation under the threat of high-skill emigration
• Fiscal competition and growth when capital is imperfectly mobile

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