Meritocracy, egalitarianism and the stability of majoritarian organizations

DOI10.1016/j.geb.2015.03.004zbMath1318.91021OpenAlexW2047903474MaRDI QIDQ2347779

Clara Ponsatí, Carmen Beviá, Salvador Barberá

Publication date: 8 June 2015

Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2015.03.004

zbMATH Keywords

egalitarianismcoalition formationassortative matinghedonic gamescore stabilitymeritocracy

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Cooperative games (91A12)

Related Items (5)

Relinquishing power, exploitation and political unemployment in democratic organizations ⋮ Rationing rules and stable coalition structures ⋮ Salvador Barberà ⋮ On the endogenous determination of the degree of meritocracy in large cooperatives ⋮ Internal hierarchy and stable coalition structures

Cites Work

• The stability of hedonic coalition structures
• Coalition formation and stability
• Competition among institutions
• The core-partition of a hedonic game
• Core in a simple coalition formation game
• Strategic nonlinear income tax competition with perfect labor mobility
• Stability of jurisdiction structures under the equal share and median rules
• Gamson's law and hedonic games
• Constitutional Rules of Exclusion in Jurisdiction Formation
• Stability and Preference Alignment in Matching and Coalition Formation
• Hedonic Coalitions: Optimality and Stability
• Clubs and the Market
• An Exploration in the Theory of Optimum Income Taxation

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