Meritocracy, egalitarianism and the stability of majoritarian organizations
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Publication:2347779
DOI10.1016/J.GEB.2015.03.004zbMATH Open1318.91021OpenAlexW2047903474MaRDI QIDQ2347779FDOQ2347779
Authors: Carmen Beviá, Clara Ponsatí, Salvador Barberà 
Publication date: 8 June 2015
Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2015.03.004
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Cites Work
- Core in a simple coalition formation game
- Gamson's law and hedonic games
- Constitutional rules of exclusion in jurisdiction formation
- The stability of hedonic coalition structures
- Stability of jurisdiction structures under the equal share and median rules
- Stability and preference alignment in matching and coalition formation
- Clubs and the Market
- An Exploration in the Theory of Optimum Income Taxation
- Competition among institutions
- Hedonic Coalitions: Optimality and Stability
- The core-partition of a hedonic game
- Coalition formation and stability
- Strategic nonlinear income tax competition with perfect labor mobility
Cited In (10)
- Training, abilities and the structure of teams
- Internal hierarchy and stable coalition structures
- Rationing rules and stable coalition structures
- The limits of meritocracy
- On the endogenous determination of the degree of meritocracy in large cooperatives
- Stable partitions for proportional generalized claims problems
- Salvador Barberà
- Belief in egalitarianism and meritocracy
- Relinquishing power, exploitation and political unemployment in democratic organizations
- A characterization of absorbing sets in coalition formation games
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