Meritocracy, egalitarianism and the stability of majoritarian organizations

DOI10.1016/J.GEB.2015.03.004MaRDI QIDQ2347779zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Carmen Beviá, Clara Ponsatí, Salvador Barberà

Publication date 8 June 2015

Published in Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2015.03.004

zbMATH Keywords

assortative matingcoalition formationcore stabilityegalitarianismhedonic gamesmeritocracy

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Cooperative games (91A12)

Recommendations

• Internal hierarchy and stable coalition structures
• On the endogenous determination of the degree of meritocracy in large cooperatives
• The stability of hedonic coalition structures
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Cites work

• An Exploration in the Theory of Optimum Income Taxation
• Clubs and the Market
• Coalition formation and stability
• Competition among institutions
• Constitutional rules of exclusion in jurisdiction formation
• Core in a simple coalition formation game
• Gamson's law and hedonic games
• Hedonic Coalitions: Optimality and Stability
• Stability and preference alignment in matching and coalition formation
• Stability of jurisdiction structures under the equal share and median rules
• Strategic nonlinear income tax competition with perfect labor mobility
• The core-partition of a hedonic game
• The stability of hedonic coalition structures

Cited in

(10)

• Relinquishing power, exploitation and political unemployment in democratic organizations
• On the endogenous determination of the degree of meritocracy in large cooperatives
• Salvador Barberà
• The limits of meritocracy
• Internal hierarchy and stable coalition structures
• Belief in egalitarianism and meritocracy
• Rationing rules and stable coalition structures
• Training, abilities and the structure of teams
• Stable partitions for proportional generalized claims problems
• A characterization of absorbing sets in coalition formation games

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