Relinquishing power, exploitation and political unemployment in democratic organizations

DOI10.1007/s00355-016-0989-5zbMath1392.91135OpenAlexW3124415211MaRDI QIDQ1690647

Carmen Beviá, Antonio Romero-Medina, Luis C. Corchon

Publication date: 12 January 2018

Published in: Social Choice and Welfare (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10016/25158

zbMATH Keywords

resource allocationexploitationplurality votingdemocratic organizationpolitical unemploymentpower relinquishing

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

History, political science (91F10)

Cites Work

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• Voting for voters: A model of electoral evolution

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