Why Did the West Extend the Franchise? Democracy, Inequality, and Growth in Historical Perspective
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Publication:2711202
DOI10.1162/003355300555042zbMath0973.91077MaRDI QIDQ2711202
James A. Robinson, Daron Acemoglu
Publication date: 6 May 2001
Published in: The Quarterly Journal of Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1162/003355300555042
91F10: History, political science
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