Gridlock or Leadership in U.S. Electoral Politics
From MaRDI portal
Publication:4644759
DOI10.1007/978-3-642-35929-3_11zbMath1419.91262MaRDI QIDQ4644759
Norman Schofield, Evan Schnidman
Publication date: 8 January 2019
Published in: Power, Voting, and Voting Power: 30 Years After (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-35929-3_11
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