A theory of voting in large elections
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Publication:863273
DOI10.1016/j.geb.2006.05.003zbMath1154.91383OpenAlexW1971856505MaRDI QIDQ863273
John W. Patty, Richard D. McKelvey
Publication date: 26 January 2007
Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://authors.library.caltech.edu/80265/
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