Local Political Equilibria

DOI10.1007/3-540-27295-X_3MaRDI QIDQ5486923zbMATH OpenFDO

Authors Norman Schofield

Publication date 18 September 2006

Published in Social Choice and Strategic Decisions (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1007/3-540-27295-X_3

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Noncooperative games (91A10) Voting theory (91B12)

Recommendations

• Local Nash equilibrium in multiparty politics
• Three-candidate competition when candidates have valence: The base case
• Equilibria in the spatial stochastic model of voting with party activists
• Generic existence of local political equilibrium
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Cited in

(13)

• Pareto optimality in spatial voting models
• Optimal location of candidates in ideological space
• Electoral defeats and local political expenditure cycles
• Local Nash equilibrium in multiparty politics
• Vote-motivated candidates
• Federal mandates with local agenda setters
• Generic existence of local political equilibrium
• When parties are not teams: party positions in single-member district and proportional representation systems
• Nash equilibria for voter models with randomly perceived positions
• Political equilibria with electoral uncertainty
• Competition for popular support: a valence model of elections in Turkey
• Three-candidate competition when candidates have valence: The base case
• A theory of voting in large elections

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