Pareto optimality in spatial voting models
This paper studies the Pareto optimality properties of the policy proposals that k candidates (k\(\geq 2)\) will make when the candidates have some uncertainty about voters' choice. Specifically, although each candidate c knows voter i's preference relation \(R_ i\) over the set of feasible policies, S, c is still uncertain about how i will actually vote. Candidates, however, hold a common subjective probability distribution \(P^ c_ i(\psi)\in [0,1]\), for the event voter i will vote for candidate c if the vector of candidate platforms is \(\psi\) . Three possible payoff functions are considered. These are (i) Expected vote, (ii) Expected plurality vote, (iii) Expected proportional vote. A crucial role is played by local responsiveness conditions which are restrictions on the degree to which the probability that a voter will vote for a particular candidate is strictly increasing in the voter's utility of proposals in a neighbourhood of that candidate's proposal. Let \(\psi_{-c}\in S^{k-1}\) denote the vector of candidate strategies excluding c's strategy, while \((x,\psi_{-c})\) is the strategy vector when x replaces c's strategy in \(\psi\). \(P(R_ i)\) is the asymmetric part of \(R_ i.\) Definition: Voting is locally responsive for c at \(\psi_{-c}\) in \(Z\subseteq S\) iff \(\forall x\in Z\), there is some voter i such that \(P^ c_ i(w,\psi_{-c})\in P^ c_ i(x,\psi_{-c})\) whenever \((w,x)\in P(R_ i)\) and \(w\in N_{\delta}(x)=\{s\in S|\) \(d(s,x)<\delta \}.\) The first result shows that under quite general assumptions, if each candidate expects locally responsive voting close to the Pareto set, then every pure Nash equilibrium strategy vector must be Pareto optimal. The second result shows that under a stronger local responsiveness condition any proposal outside the Pareto set is strictly dominated by a proposal inside the Pareto set. Hence, in any mixed strategy Nash equilibrium each candidate will assign zero probability to the set of points outside the Pareto set.
- Probabilistic Voting in the Spatial Model of Elections: The Theory of Office-motivated Candidates
- Policy convergence in a two-candidate probabilistic voting model
- Nash equilibrium in multiparty competition with ``stochastic voters
- Local Political Equilibria
- Local equilibrium equivalence in probabilistic voting models
- A dynamical model of political equilibrium
- A note on the probability of casting a decisive vote
- Abstentions and majority equilibrium
- Advances in the spatial theory of voting.
- Candidates with policy preferences: A dynamic model
- Cyclic sets in multidimensional voting models
- Davis-Hinich conditions and median outcomes in probabilistic voting models
- Directional and local electoral equilibria with probabilistic voting
- Equilibrium in spatial voting: The median voter result is an artifact
- Expected Plurality Voting Equilibrium and Social Choice Functions
- General Conditions for Global Intransitivities in Formal Voting Models
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 4018807 (Why is no real title available?)
- Intransitivities in multidimensional voting models and some implications for agenda control
- Maximal elements of acyclic relations on compact sets
- On the existence of maximal elements
- Policy Related Voting and Electoral Equilibrium
- Asymptotic properties of the paths in a specific voting model
- Pressure group size and the politics of income redistribution
- Policies over time and Pareto optimality
- Bounds for mixed strategy equilibria and the spatial model of elections
- A model of candidate convergence under uncertainty about voter preferences
- Pareto efficiency in multiple referendum
- Pure strategy Nash equilibria for bargaining models of collective choice
- Equilibria in multi-party competition under uncertainty
- Equilibria in the spatial stochastic model of voting with party activists
This page was built for publication: Pareto optimality in spatial voting models
Report a bug (only for logged in users!)Click here to report a bug for this page (MaRDI item Q1091239)
