Local equilibrium equivalence in probabilistic voting models
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Publication:2485493
DOI10.1016/j.geb.2004.11.002zbMath1099.91040MaRDI QIDQ2485493
Publication date: 5 August 2005
Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2004.11.002
91B12: Voting theory
Related Items
The political economy of (de)centralization with complementary public goods, Political competition between differentiated candidates, Policy convergence in a two-candidate probabilistic voting model, Political equilibria with electoral uncertainty, A theory of voting in large elections, Vote-motivated candidates, A model of electoral competition with abstaining voters, The equivalence between costly and probabilistic voting models
Cites Work
- A theory of voting in large elections
- Special majority rules and the existence of voting equilibria
- Directional and local electoral equilibria with probabilistic voting
- Equilibrium in spatial voting: The median voter result is an artifact
- Quantal response equilibria for extensive form games
- Local Nash equilibrium in multiparty politics
- Quantal response equilibria for normal form games
- Generic difference of expected vote share and probability of victory maximization in simple plurality elections with probabilistic voters
- Electoral competition with policy-motivated candidates
- Probabilistic Voting in the Spatial Model of Elections: The Theory of Office-motivated Candidates
