Generic difference of expected vote share and probability of victory maximization in simple plurality elections with probabilistic voters

DOI10.1007/s00355-006-0200-5zbMath1133.91012OpenAlexW2055907345MaRDI QIDQ2460087

John W. Patty

Publication date: 14 November 2007

Published in: Social Choice and Welfare (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00355-006-0200-5

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Voting theory (91B12)

Related Items (7)

A model of electoral competition with abstaining voters ⋮ A theory of voting in large elections ⋮ Political competition between differentiated candidates ⋮ Policy convergence in a two-candidate probabilistic voting model ⋮ Vote-motivated candidates ⋮ Political equilibria with electoral uncertainty ⋮ Local equilibrium equivalence in probabilistic voting models

Cites Work

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• Equilibrium in spatial voting: The median voter result is an artifact
• Infinite dimensional analysis. A hitchhiker's guide
• Prevalence: a translation-invariant “almost every” on infinite-dimensional spaces

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