Generic difference of expected vote share and probability of victory maximization in simple plurality elections with probabilistic voters

DOI10.1007/S00355-006-0200-5MaRDI QIDQ2460087zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors John W. Patty

Publication date 14 November 2007

Published in Social Choice and Welfare (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1007/s00355-006-0200-5

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Voting theory (91B12)

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Cites work

• Equilibrium in spatial voting: The median voter result is an artifact
• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3443893 (Why is no real title available?)
• Infinite dimensional analysis. A hitchhiker's guide
• Prevalence: a translation-invariant “almost every” on infinite-dimensional spaces

Cited in

(10)

• Vote-motivated candidates
• How to win a large election
• The theoretical Shapley-Shubik probability of an election inversion in a toy symmetric version of the US presidential electoral system
• A model of electoral competition with abstaining voters
• Local equilibrium equivalence in probabilistic voting models
• Political competition between differentiated candidates
• Policy convergence in a two-candidate probabilistic voting model
• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 6928629 (Why is no real title available?)
• Political equilibria with electoral uncertainty
• A theory of voting in large elections

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