The theoretical Shapley-Shubik probability of an election inversion in a toy symmetric version of the US presidential electoral system

DOI10.1007/S00355-018-1162-0MaRDI QIDQ2179470zbMATH OpenOpenAlexWikidataFDO

Authors Olivier de Mouzon, Thibault Laurent, Michel Le Breton, Dominique Lepelley

Publication date 12 May 2020

Published in Social Choice and Welfare (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1007/s00355-018-1162-0

zbMATH Keywords

election inversionShapley-Shubik probabilityUS presidential electoral system

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Voting theory (91B12)

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• Probabilities of Certain Election Results
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Cited in

(7)

• The probability of majority inversion in a two-stage voting system with three states
• Asymptotic probability of majority inversion under a general binomial voting model
• “One Man, One Vote” Part 1: Electoral Justice in the U.S. Electoral College: Banzhaf and Shapley/Shubik Versus May
• The power of small coalitions under two-tier majority on regular graphs
• Welfare ordering of voting weight allocations
• Probability of majority inversion with three states and interval preferences
• Weighted simple games and the topology of simplicial complexes

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