Voter Antagonism and the Paradox of Voting
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Publication:4045859
Cited in
(21)- Coincidence probabilities for simple majority and proportional lottery rules
- Developing the aggregate empirical side of computational social choice
- The expected likelihood of transitivity for probabilistic choosers with single-peaked preferences
- Finding sharper distinctions for conditions of transitivity of the majority method.
- The difference between manipulability indices in the IC and IANC models
- Condorcet's paradox
- Robustness against inefficient manipulation
- Correlation, partitioning and the probability of casting a decisive vote under the majority rule
- Aggregation of preferences: a review
- Average weights and power in weighted voting games
- The theoretical Shapley-Shubik probability of an election inversion in a toy symmetric version of the US presidential electoral system
- The Condorcet efficiency of Borda Rule with anonymous voters
- Binary linear programming solutions and non-approximability for control problems in voting systems
- Majority properties of positional social preference correspondences
- Social unacceptability for simple voting procedures
- The Effect of Closeness on the Election of a Pairwise Majority Rule Winner
- From Gehrlein-Fishburn’s Method on Frequency Representation to a Direct Proof of Ehrhart’s extended Conjecture
- IAC Probability Calculations in Voting Theory: Progress Report
- The expected likelihood of transitivity for a probabilistic chooser
- Susceptibility to Manipulation by Sincere Truncation: The Case of Scoring Rules and Scoring Runoff Systems
- The expected likelihood of transitivity: A survey
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