Voter Antagonism and the Paradox of Voting

Cited In (21)

Coincidence probabilities for simple majority and proportional lottery rules
Developing the aggregate empirical side of computational social choice
The expected likelihood of transitivity for probabilistic choosers with single-peaked preferences
Finding sharper distinctions for conditions of transitivity of the majority method.
The difference between manipulability indices in the IC and IANC models
Condorcet's paradox
Robustness against inefficient manipulation
Correlation, partitioning and the probability of casting a decisive vote under the majority rule
Aggregation of preferences: a review
Average weights and power in weighted voting games
The Condorcet efficiency of Borda Rule with anonymous voters
The theoretical Shapley-Shubik probability of an election inversion in a toy symmetric version of the US presidential electoral system
Majority properties of positional social preference correspondences
Binary linear programming solutions and non-approximability for control problems in voting systems
Social unacceptability for simple voting procedures
The Effect of Closeness on the Election of a Pairwise Majority Rule Winner
From Gehrlein-Fishburn’s Method on Frequency Representation to a Direct Proof of Ehrhart’s extended Conjecture
IAC Probability Calculations in Voting Theory: Progress Report
Susceptibility to Manipulation by Sincere Truncation: The Case of Scoring Rules and Scoring Runoff Systems
The expected likelihood of transitivity for a probabilistic chooser
The expected likelihood of transitivity: A survey

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