Majority properties of positional social preference correspondences

DOI10.1007/S11238-021-09828-XzbMATH Open1484.91170OpenAlexW3172016969MaRDI QIDQ2114567FDOQ2114567

Authors Mostapha Diss, Michele Gori 

Publication date 15 March 2022

Published in Theory and Decision (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://crese.univ-fcomte.fr/uploads/wp/WP-2020-06.pdf

zbMATH Keywords

probabilityCondorcet consistencysocial preference correspondencequalified majoritypositional rule

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Social choice (91B14)

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Cites work

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Cited in

(7)

• Does majoritarian approval matter in selecting a social choice rule? an exploratory panel study
• Balancedness of social choice correspondences
• Absolute qualified majoritarianism: how does the threshold matter?
• Characterizing majority rule: from profiles to societies
• The \(q\)-majority efficiency of positional rules
• Is the preference of the majority representative?
• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 4008057 (Why is no real title available?)

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