Symmetric majority rules
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Publication:898759
DOI10.1016/J.MATHSOCSCI.2015.04.002zbMATH Open1331.91067arXiv1503.04028OpenAlexW2037174887MaRDI QIDQ898759FDOQ898759
Authors: Daniela Bubboloni, Michele Gori 
Publication date: 18 December 2015
Published in: Mathematical Social Sciences (Search for Journal in Brave)
Abstract: In the standard arrovian framework and under the assumption that individual preferences and social outcomes are linear orders on the set of alternatives, we study the rules which satisfy suitable symmetries and obey the majority principle. In particular, supposing that individuals and alternatives are exogenously partitioned into subcommittees and subclasses, we provide necessary and sufficient conditions for the existence of reversal symmetric majority rules that are anonymous and neutral with respect to the considered partitions. We also determine a general method for constructing and counting those rules and we explicitly apply it to some simple cases.
Full work available at URL: https://arxiv.org/abs/1503.04028
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Cited In (11)
- Symmetry groups
- On the reversal bias of the minimax social choice correspondence
- Anonymous and neutral majority rules
- Majority rule for profiles of arbitrary length, with an emphasis on the consistency axiom
- Anonymous, neutral, and resolute social choice revisited
- Breaking ties in collective decision-making
- Majority properties of positional social preference correspondences
- Signatures of indirect majority systems
- Combinatorics of Election Scores
- Resolute refinements of social choice correspondences
- The flow network method
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