Symmetric majority rules

DOI10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2015.04.002zbMath1331.91067arXiv1503.04028OpenAlexW2037174887MaRDI QIDQ898759

Daniela Bubboloni, Michele Gori

Publication date: 18 December 2015

Published in: Mathematical Social Sciences (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://arxiv.org/abs/1503.04028

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Voting theory (91B12) Social choice (91B14)

Related Items (8)

On the reversal bias of the minimax social choice correspondence ⋮ Combinatorics of Election Scores ⋮ The flow network method ⋮ Resolute refinements of social choice correspondences ⋮ Majority rule for profiles of arbitrary length, with an emphasis on the consistency axiom ⋮ Breaking ties in collective decision-making ⋮ Anonymous, neutral, and resolute social choice revisited ⋮ Majority properties of positional social preference correspondences

Cites Work

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• Anonymous and neutral majority rules
• Majority selection of one alternative from a binary agenda
• Maskin monotonic aggregation rules and partial anonymity
• Aggregation rules that satisfy anonymity and neutrality
• Anonymity, monotonicity, and limited neutrality: selecting a single alternative from a binary agenda
• The majority rule with a chairman
• Symmetry groups

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