Anonymity, monotonicity, and limited neutrality: selecting a single alternative from a binary agenda

DOI10.1016/J.ECONLET.2012.08.028MaRDI QIDQ2444157zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Donald E. Campbell, Jerry S. Kelly

Publication date 8 April 2014

Published in Economics Letters (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1016/j.econlet.2012.08.028

zbMATH Keywords

anonymitymonotonicityneutralitysocial choice function

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Voting theory (91B12) Social choice (91B14)

Recommendations

• Majority selection of one alternative from a binary agenda
• Anonymous and neutral majority rules
• Anonymous, neutral, and resolute social choice revisited
• Anonymity, monotonicity, and quota pair systems
• Pareto, anonymity or neutrality, but not IIA: countably many alternatives

Cited in

(9)

• Yet another characterization of the majority rule
• Breaking ties in collective decision-making
• Characterization of tie-breaking plurality rules
• Anonymous and neutral majority rules
• Resolute refinements of social choice correspondences
• Flexible majority rules in democracyville: a guided tour
• Majority selection of one alternative from a binary agenda
• Symmetric majority rules
• Anonymity, monotonicity, and quota pair systems

This page was built for publication: Anonymity, monotonicity, and limited neutrality: selecting a single alternative from a binary agenda

Report a bug (only for logged in users!)Click here to report a bug for this page (MaRDI item Q2444157)