Majority selection of one alternative from a binary agenda
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Cites work
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3400720 (Why is no real title available?)
- A Set of Independent Necessary and Sufficient Conditions for Simple Majority Decision
- A complete characterization of majority rules
- A new characterization of the majority rule
- A simple characterization of majority rule
- Another characterization of the majority rule.
- Nash Equilibrium and Welfare Optimality
Cited in
(11)- Partially dominant choice
- Anonymous and neutral majority rules
- How to Put through Your Agenda in Collective Binary Decisions
- Symmetric majority rules
- Collective identity functions with status quo
- Breaking ties in collective decision-making
- Anonymity, monotonicity, and limited neutrality: selecting a single alternative from a binary agenda
- Anonymous and positively responsive aggregation rules
- The sufficient and necessary condition of the major stochastic preference rule in group decision making
- Resolute refinements of social choice correspondences
- Flexible majority rules in democracyville: a guided tour
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