Symmetric majority rules

DOI10.1016/J.MATHSOCSCI.2015.04.002MaRDI QIDQ898759zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Daniela Bubboloni, Michele Gori

Publication date 18 December 2015

Published in Mathematical Social Sciences (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://arxiv.org/abs/1503.04028

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Social choice (91B14) Voting theory (91B12)

Abstract: In the standard arrovian framework and under the assumption that individual preferences and social outcomes are linear orders on the set of alternatives, we study the rules which satisfy suitable symmetries and obey the majority principle. In particular, supposing that individuals and alternatives are exogenously partitioned into subcommittees and subclasses, we provide necessary and sufficient conditions for the existence of reversal symmetric majority rules that are anonymous and neutral with respect to the considered partitions. We also determine a general method for constructing and counting those rules and we explicitly apply it to some simple cases.

Recommendations

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• Symmetry of simple games and permission of voters.
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Cites work

• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3864918 (Why is no real title available?)
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• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3223737 (Why is no real title available?)
• Aggregation rules that satisfy anonymity and neutrality
• Anonymity, monotonicity, and limited neutrality: selecting a single alternative from a binary agenda
• Anonymous and neutral majority rules
• Majority selection of one alternative from a binary agenda
• Maskin monotonic aggregation rules and partial anonymity
• Symmetry groups
• The majority rule with a chairman

Cited in

(11)

• Symmetry groups
• On the reversal bias of the minimax social choice correspondence
• Anonymous and neutral majority rules
• Majority rule for profiles of arbitrary length, with an emphasis on the consistency axiom
• Anonymous, neutral, and resolute social choice revisited
• Breaking ties in collective decision-making
• Majority properties of positional social preference correspondences
• Signatures of indirect majority systems
• Combinatorics of Election Scores
• Resolute refinements of social choice correspondences
• The flow network method

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