Resolute refinements of social choice correspondences
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Abstract: Many classical social choice correspondences are resolute only in the case of two alternatives and an odd number of individuals. Thus, in most cases, they admit several resolute refinements, each of them naturally interpreted as a tie-breaking rule, satisfying different properties. In this paper we look for classes of social choice correspondences which admit resolute refinements fulfilling suitable versions of anonymity and neutrality. In particular, supposing that individuals and alternatives have been exogenously partitioned into subcommittees and subclasses, we find out arithmetical conditions on the sizes of subcommittees and subclasses that are necessary and sufficient for making any social choice correspondence which is efficient, anonymous with respect to subcommittees, neutral with respect to subclasses and possibly immune to the reversal bias admit a resolute refinement sharing the same properties.
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Cites work
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3864918 (Why is no real title available?)
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3445421 (Why is no real title available?)
- Anonymity, monotonicity, and limited neutrality: selecting a single alternative from a binary agenda
- Anonymous and neutral majority rules
- Concorcet's principle implies the no show paradox
- Condorcet Social Choice Functions
- Consequences of reversing preferences
- Geometry of voting
- Majority selection of one alternative from a binary agenda
- On the reversal bias of the minimax social choice correspondence
- Symmetric majority rules
- The finer structure of resolute, neutral, and anonymous social choice correspondences
Cited in
(11)- The finer structure of resolute, neutral, and anonymous social choice correspondences
- Independent social choice correspondences
- The flow network method
- Strategy-proof resolute social choice correspondences
- Breaking ties in collective decision-making
- Characterizing the resolute part of monotonic social choice correspondences
- On the reversal bias of the minimax social choice correspondence
- Anonymous and neutral social choice: a unified framework for existence results, maximal domains and tie-breaking
- Majority rule for profiles of arbitrary length, with an emphasis on the consistency axiom
- On two new social choice correspondences.
- Anonymous, neutral, and resolute social choice revisited
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