Resolute refinements of social choice correspondences
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Publication:502364
DOI10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2016.08.007zbMath1397.91186arXiv1506.06069OpenAlexW2591941710MaRDI QIDQ502364
Daniela Bubboloni, Michele Gori
Publication date: 5 January 2017
Published in: Mathematical Social Sciences (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://arxiv.org/abs/1506.06069
Related Items (5)
The flow network method ⋮ Majority rule for profiles of arbitrary length, with an emphasis on the consistency axiom ⋮ Breaking ties in collective decision-making ⋮ Anonymous, neutral, and resolute social choice revisited ⋮ Anonymous and neutral social choice: a unified framework for existence results, maximal domains and tie-breaking
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- Geometry of voting
- Anonymity, monotonicity, and limited neutrality: selecting a single alternative from a binary agenda
- Consequences of reversing preferences
- Condorcet Social Choice Functions
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