Resolute refinements of social choice correspondences
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Publication:502364
DOI10.1016/J.MATHSOCSCI.2016.08.007zbMATH Open1397.91186arXiv1506.06069OpenAlexW2591941710MaRDI QIDQ502364FDOQ502364
Authors: Daniela Bubboloni, Michele Gori 
Publication date: 5 January 2017
Published in: Mathematical Social Sciences (Search for Journal in Brave)
Abstract: Many classical social choice correspondences are resolute only in the case of two alternatives and an odd number of individuals. Thus, in most cases, they admit several resolute refinements, each of them naturally interpreted as a tie-breaking rule, satisfying different properties. In this paper we look for classes of social choice correspondences which admit resolute refinements fulfilling suitable versions of anonymity and neutrality. In particular, supposing that individuals and alternatives have been exogenously partitioned into subcommittees and subclasses, we find out arithmetical conditions on the sizes of subcommittees and subclasses that are necessary and sufficient for making any social choice correspondence which is efficient, anonymous with respect to subcommittees, neutral with respect to subclasses and possibly immune to the reversal bias admit a resolute refinement sharing the same properties.
Full work available at URL: https://arxiv.org/abs/1506.06069
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Cited In (11)
- On the reversal bias of the minimax social choice correspondence
- Majority rule for profiles of arbitrary length, with an emphasis on the consistency axiom
- Anonymous, neutral, and resolute social choice revisited
- Independent social choice correspondences
- On two new social choice correspondences.
- Breaking ties in collective decision-making
- Strategy-proof resolute social choice correspondences
- Characterizing the resolute part of monotonic social choice correspondences
- The finer structure of resolute, neutral, and anonymous social choice correspondences
- The flow network method
- Anonymous and neutral social choice: a unified framework for existence results, maximal domains and tie-breaking
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