Strategy-proof resolute social choice correspondences
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Publication:2467525
DOI10.1007/s00355-007-0223-6zbMath1142.91441OpenAlexW2042058726MaRDI QIDQ2467525
Selçuk Özyurt, M. Remzi Sanver
Publication date: 22 January 2008
Published in: Social Choice and Welfare (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00355-007-0223-6
Related Items (9)
A general impossibility result on strategy-proof social choice hyperfunctions ⋮ Manipulability of consular election rules ⋮ Manipulability in a group activity selection problem ⋮ On the alternating use of ``unanimity and ``surjectivity in the Gibbard-Satterthwaite theorem ⋮ A fundamental structure of strategy-proof social choice correspondences with restricted preferences over alternatives ⋮ Tops-only domains ⋮ Generalizing the Gibbard-Satterthwaite theorem: partial preferences, the degree of manipulation, and multi-valuedness ⋮ Voting games of resolute social choice correspondences ⋮ Choosers as extension axioms
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