Voting games of resolute social choice correspondences
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Publication:2516133
DOI10.1007/s00355-015-0872-9zbMath1341.91067MaRDI QIDQ2516133
M. Remzi Sanver, Sinan Ertemel, Levent Kutlu
Publication date: 11 August 2015
Published in: Social Choice and Welfare (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00355-015-0872-9
91A12: Cooperative games
91B12: Voting theory
91A40: Other game-theoretic models
91B14: Social choice
Related Items
Cites Work
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