On the rule of k names
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Publication:993784
DOI10.1016/J.GEB.2009.03.008zbMATH Open1200.91084OpenAlexW2166044814MaRDI QIDQ993784FDOQ993784
Authors: Danilo Coelho, Salvador Barberà 
Publication date: 20 September 2010
Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2009.03.008
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Cites Work
- Strong equilibrium outcomes of voting games are the generalized Condorcet winners
- Voting by Committees
- The Condorcet criterion and committee selection
- Sets of alternatives as Condorcet winners
- An Analysis of Simple Voting Systems for Electing Committees
- Equilibrium Strategies for Final-Offer Arbitration: There is no Median Convergence
- Binding Versus Final-Offer Arbitration: A Combination is Best
- How to choose a non-controversial list with \(k\) names
- Final-Offer Arbitration
Cited In (14)
- Social Choice Theory
- Strongly sincere best responses under approval voting and arbitrary preferences
- On strategy-proofness and single-peakedness: median-voting over intervals
- How to choose a non-controversial list with \(k\) names
- Dynamic legislative decision making when interest groups control the agenda
- On the advantages and disadvantages of being the first mover under rules of \(k\) names
- A solution to the two-person implementation problem
- Order-\(k\) rationality
- Voting games of resolute social choice correspondences
- Bargaining through approval
- A basic method for naming Persian karbandis using a set of numbers
- Choosers as extension axioms
- Manipulability of consular election rules
- Balancing the power to appoint officers
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