On the rule of k names
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Recommendations
- A general mathematics of names
- A theory of name boundedness
- On the advantages and disadvantages of being the first mover under rules of \(k\) names
- A Shannon-McMillan theorem for motley names
- On explicit substitutions and names (extended abstract)
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3878142
- The naming game on the complete graph
- On explicit substitution with names
- Asymptotic properties of restricted naming games
Cites work
- An Analysis of Simple Voting Systems for Electing Committees
- Binding Versus Final-Offer Arbitration: A Combination is Best
- Equilibrium Strategies for Final-Offer Arbitration: There is no Median Convergence
- Final-Offer Arbitration
- How to choose a non-controversial list with \(k\) names
- Sets of alternatives as Condorcet winners
- Strong equilibrium outcomes of voting games are the generalized Condorcet winners
- The Condorcet criterion and committee selection
- Voting by Committees
Cited in
(14)- Voting games of resolute social choice correspondences
- A basic method for naming Persian karbandis using a set of numbers
- Order-\(k\) rationality
- Choosers as extension axioms
- Dynamic legislative decision making when interest groups control the agenda
- Social Choice Theory
- Bargaining through approval
- A solution to the two-person implementation problem
- On strategy-proofness and single-peakedness: median-voting over intervals
- Strongly sincere best responses under approval voting and arbitrary preferences
- How to choose a non-controversial list with \(k\) names
- Manipulability of consular election rules
- Balancing the power to appoint officers
- On the advantages and disadvantages of being the first mover under rules of \(k\) names
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