Equilibrium Strategies for Final-Offer Arbitration: There is no Median Convergence

DOI10.1287/mnsc.29.8.927zbMath0518.90102OpenAlexW2124074000MaRDI QIDQ3669208

Samuel III Merrill, Steven J. Brams

Publication date: 1983

Published in: Management Science (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.29.8.927

zbMATH Keywords

mixed strategiesequilibrium strategiesgroup decisionsfinal-offer arbitrationlocal and global equilibria in pure strategiesmedian convergencetwo- person zero-sum game of imperfect information

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Cooperative games (91A12)

Related Items (14)

The gambling effect of final-offer arbitration in bargaining ⋮ N-Player Final-Offer Arbitration: Harmonic Numbers in Equilibrium ⋮ An analysis of dual-issue final-offer arbitration ⋮ An amendment to final-offer arbitration. ⋮ Arbitration procedures with multiple arbitrators ⋮ Bargaining with random implementation: an experimental study ⋮ Perfect equilibria in a model of bargaining with arbitration ⋮ On the rule of \(k\) names ⋮ Dual-Issue Final-Offer Arbitration: Invariance of Pure Optimal Strategies Under Lp Metrics ⋮ How Best to Disagree in Order to Agree? ⋮ Double-offer arbitration ⋮ Arbitration using the closest offer principle of arbitrator behavior. ⋮ Effects of multiple arbitrators on final-offer arbitration settlements ⋮ Bargaining outcomes with double-offer arbitration

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