Perfect equilibria in a model of bargaining with arbitration

DOI10.1006/game.2000.0823zbMath0997.91003MaRDI QIDQ5953420

Paola Manzini, Marco Mariotti

Publication date: 14 November 2002

Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1006/game.2000.0823

zbMATH Keywords

bargaining; arbitration; outside option

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

91A10: Noncooperative games

91A05: 2-person games

91B26: Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models

Related Items

Bargaining over a climate deal: deadline and delay, Holdup and innovation, Arbitration systems and negotiations, Bargaining with split-the-difference arbitration, The gambling effect of final-offer arbitration in bargaining, Simultaneous-offers bargaining with a mediator, Alternating-offer games with final-offer arbitration, Stakeholder bargaining games, How Best to Disagree in Order to Agree?, Union Leaders as Experts: Wage Bargaining and Strikes with Union-Wide Ballot Requirements*

Cites Work

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