Perfect equilibria in a model of bargaining with arbitration

DOI10.1006/game.2000.0823zbMath0997.91003OpenAlexW1986348178MaRDI QIDQ5953420

Paola Manzini, Marco Mariotti

Publication date: 14 November 2002

Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1006/game.2000.0823

zbMATH Keywords

bargainingarbitrationoutside option

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Noncooperative games (91A10) 2-person games (91A05) Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26)

Related Items (10)

Union Leaders as Experts: Wage Bargaining and Strikes with Union-Wide Ballot Requirements* ⋮ Arbitration systems and negotiations ⋮ The gambling effect of final-offer arbitration in bargaining ⋮ Bargaining with split-the-difference arbitration ⋮ Bargaining over a climate deal: deadline and delay ⋮ Stakeholder bargaining games ⋮ Simultaneous-offers bargaining with a mediator ⋮ Alternating-offer games with final-offer arbitration ⋮ How Best to Disagree in Order to Agree? ⋮ Holdup and innovation

Cites Work

• Unnamed Item
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• A letter to the editor on wage bargaining
• Double-offer arbitration
• Money burning and multiple equilibria in bargaining
• Rubinstein bargaining with two-sided outside options
• Strategic bargaining with destructive power.
• Equilibrium Strategies for Final-Offer Arbitration: There is no Median Convergence
• Binding Versus Final-Offer Arbitration: A Combination is Best
• Perfect Equilibrium in a Bargaining Model
• Fair Bargains: Distributive Justice and Nash Bargaining Theory
• Preferences Over Solutions to the Bargaining Problem
• Perfect Equilibria in a Negotiation Model
• On the Role of Outside Options in Bargaining with Obstinate Parties

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