Holdup and innovation

DOI10.1007/S00712-005-0130-1MaRDI QIDQ814835zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Andrew Wait

Publication date 7 February 2006

Published in Journal of Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1007/s00712-005-0130-1

zbMATH Keywords

delayincomplete contractsholdup

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Production theory, theory of the firm (91B38)

Recommendations

• The hold-up problem, innovations, and limited liability
• A dynamic theory of holdup.
• Bargaining over incentive contracts
• Hold-up, asset ownership, and reference points
• Holdup and licensing of cumulative innovations with private information

Cites work

• A Multistage Model of Bargaining
• A Theory of Debt Based on the Inalienability of Human Capital
• A letter to the editor on wage bargaining
• Bargaining and Strikes
• Bargaining with Deadlines and Imperfect Player Control
• Creative bargaining
• Cyclical Delay in Bargaining with Externalities
• Does Asset Ownership Always Motivate Managers? Outside Options and the Property Rights Theory of the Firm
• Gradualism and Irreversibility
• Incomplete Contracts and Renegotiation
• Information Revelation and Strategic Delay in a Model of Investment
• Involuntary Unemployment as a Perfect Equilibrium in a Bargaining Model
• Money burning and multiple equilibria in bargaining
• Negative Externalities May Cause Delay in Negotiation
• Perfect Equilibria in a Negotiation Model
• Perfect equilibria in a model of bargaining with arbitration
• Repeated bargaining with persistent private information
• Sequential Bargaining with Incomplete Information

Cited in

(3)

• The hold-up problem, innovations, and limited liability
• The dynamics of productive assets, contract duration and holdup
• Silent financial interests and product innovation

This page was built for publication: Holdup and innovation

Report a bug (only for logged in users!)Click here to report a bug for this page (MaRDI item Q814835)