Holdup and innovation
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Publication:814835
DOI10.1007/S00712-005-0130-1zbMath1121.91376OpenAlexW2092412926MaRDI QIDQ814835
Publication date: 7 February 2006
Published in: Journal of Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00712-005-0130-1
Related Items (1)
Cites Work
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- A Theory of Debt Based on the Inalienability of Human Capital
- Perfect Equilibria in a Negotiation Model
- Negative Externalities May Cause Delay in Negotiation
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- Perfect equilibria in a model of bargaining with arbitration
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