Holdup and innovation
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Publication:814835
DOI10.1007/S00712-005-0130-1zbMATH Open1121.91376OpenAlexW2092412926MaRDI QIDQ814835FDOQ814835
Authors: Andrew Wait
Publication date: 7 February 2006
Published in: Journal of Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00712-005-0130-1
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Cites Work
- Involuntary Unemployment as a Perfect Equilibrium in a Bargaining Model
- Sequential Bargaining with Incomplete Information
- Information Revelation and Strategic Delay in a Model of Investment
- Gradualism and Irreversibility
- Negative Externalities May Cause Delay in Negotiation
- Cyclical Delay in Bargaining with Externalities
- Incomplete Contracts and Renegotiation
- Money burning and multiple equilibria in bargaining
- Does Asset Ownership Always Motivate Managers? Outside Options and the Property Rights Theory of the Firm
- A Multistage Model of Bargaining
- Bargaining with Deadlines and Imperfect Player Control
- Perfect Equilibria in a Negotiation Model
- A letter to the editor on wage bargaining
- Perfect equilibria in a model of bargaining with arbitration
- A Theory of Debt Based on the Inalienability of Human Capital
- Creative bargaining
- Bargaining and Strikes
- Repeated bargaining with persistent private information
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