Bargaining with Deadlines and Imperfect Player Control
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Publication:4286286
DOI10.2307/2951644zbMATH Open0866.90145OpenAlexW1973767645MaRDI QIDQ4286286FDOQ4286286
Michael Manove, Ching-to Albert Ma
Publication date: 27 April 1994
Published in: Econometrica (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://semanticscholar.org/paper/f597e8269a51198f0d1bd68cb8b81c85e3bde929
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- A theory of search with deadlines and uncertain recall
- Finite horizon bargaining with outside options and threat points
- Dynamic coordination games
- Optimal deadlines for agreements
- Alternating-offers bargaining with one-sided uncertain deadlines: an efficient algorithm
- Delay in the alternating-offers model of bargaining
- Bargaining with incomplete information
- Multilateral bargaining with concession costs
- A characterization of a limit solution for finite horizon bargaining problems
- DEADLINE EFFECTS IN SEQUENTIAL BARGAINING — AN EXPERIMENTAL STUDY
- The value of information on deadlines; successful opaque management
- Collective hold‐up
- Tough negotiations: bilateral bargaining with durable commitments
- A non-cooperative foundation for the continuous Raiffa solution
- Dynamic matching and bargaining with heterogeneous deadlines
- The deadline effect
- Bargaining under a deadline: Evidence from the reverse ultimatum game.
- Modelling negotiated decision making in environmental and natural resource management: a multilateral, multiple issues, non-cooperative bargaining model with uncertainty
- Holdup and innovation
- The unanimity rule under a two-agent fixed sequential order voting
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