Deadline effects and inefficient delay in bargaining with endogenous commitment
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Bilateral (sequential) negotiators delay agreements until a deadline if a player that rejects an offer is subsequently committed not to accept any poorer proposal, and if the common discount factor is close enough to one.
Recommendations
Cited in
(34)- Bargaining with durable offers and endogenous timing
- Creative bargaining
- Bargaining with imperfect commitment
- Bargaining under a deadline: Evidence from the reverse ultimatum game.
- The optimal degree of commitment in a negotiation with a deadline
- Selective acceptance and inefficiency in a two-issue complete information bargaining game
- Delay in multilateral bargaining under complete information
- No compromise: uncertain costs in reputational bargaining
- Strategic delay and endogeneous offers in bargaining games with private information
- Bargaining and waning commitments
- Alternating-offers bargaining with one-sided uncertain deadlines: an efficient algorithm
- Bargaining with history-dependent preferences
- BARGAINING WITH COMMITMENT UNDER AN UNCERTAIN DEADLINE
- WAGE NEGOTIATION UNDER GOOD FAITH BARGAINING
- Bargaining with Deadlines and Imperfect Player Control
- A characterization of a limit solution for finite horizon bargaining problems
- Reputational bargaining and deadlines
- Optimal deadlines for agreements
- Bargaining over a climate deal: deadline and delay
- Tough negotiations: bilateral bargaining with durable commitments
- Dynamic matching and bargaining with heterogeneous deadlines
- DEADLINE EFFECTS IN SEQUENTIAL BARGAINING — AN EXPERIMENTAL STUDY
- Collective hold‐up
- The prevalence of take-it-or-leave-it offers
- Tax contracts, party bargaining, and government formation
- Contractual delay and efficiency in delegation games. Two-principal case
- Equilibrium payoffs and proposal ratios in bargaining models
- Alternating-offer bargaining with endogenous commitment
- Bargaining with incomplete information
- Finite horizon bargaining with outside options and threat points
- Bargaining, reference points, and limited influence
- Multilateral bargaining with concession costs
- Commitment in alternating offers bargaining
- Delay in the alternating-offers model of bargaining
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