Bargaining over a climate deal: deadline and delay

DOI10.1007/s10479-011-1018-9zbMath1301.91031MaRDI QIDQ475303

Pierre Courtois, Tarik Tazdaït

Publication date: 26 November 2014

Published in: Annals of Operations Research (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s10479-011-1018-9

zbMATH Keywords

bargaining; irreversibility; deforestation; transfer; deadline; climate treaty; ultimatum

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

91A40: Other game-theoretic models

91B76: Environmental economics (natural resource models, harvesting, pollution, etc.)

91B26: Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models

91B69: Heterogeneous agent models

Related Items

Collaborative environmental management for transboundary air pollution problems: a differential levies game

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