On the robustness of perfect equilibrium in fixed cost sequential bargaining under an isomorphic transformation

DOI10.1016/0165-1765(91)90049-QMaRDI QIDQ806749zbMATH OpenFDO

Authors Eythan Weg, Rami Zwick

Publication date 1991

Published in Economics Letters (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1016/0165-1765(91)90049-Q

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Cooperative games (91A12) Multistage and repeated games (91A20) Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26)

Cites work

• Effects of fixed costs in two-person sequential bargaining
• Perfect Equilibrium in a Bargaining Model
• Two-person bargaining behavior in fixed discounting factors games with infinite horizon

Cited in

(4)

• Two-person sequential bargaining behavior with exogenous breakdown
• The bargaining trap
• Bargaining over a climate deal: deadline and delay
• Multilateral bargaining over the division of losses

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