An Experimental Study of Buyer-Seller Negotiation with One-Sided Incomplete Information and Time Discounting

DOI10.1287/mnsc.41.3.377zbMath0832.90025OpenAlexW2026289058MaRDI QIDQ4849389

Ido Erev, Rami Zwick, Amnon Rapoport

Publication date: 25 September 1995

Published in: Management Science (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.41.3.377

zbMATH Keywords

time discountingexperimental economicsone-sided incomplete informationmultiperiod bargaining mechanismprice of an indivisible good

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Cooperative games (91A12) Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26)

Related Items (4)

Subgame perfection in ultimatum bargaining trees ⋮ Bargaining over a climate deal: deadline and delay ⋮ Unnamed Item ⋮ Multi-period bargaining: Asymmetric information and risk aversion

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