Can international environmental cooperation be bought?

DOI10.1016/J.EJOR.2009.05.006zbMATH Open1173.91430OpenAlexW1971618393MaRDI QIDQ1038409FDOQ1038409

Authors: Cristina Fuentes-Albero, S. J. Rubio 

Publication date: 17 November 2009

Published in: European Journal of Operational Research (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ejor.2009.05.006

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zbMATH Keywords

emissionstransfersself-enforcing international environmental agreementslinear environmental damages

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Environmental economics (natural resource models, harvesting, pollution, etc.) (91B76) Multistage and repeated games (91A20) Experimental studies (91A90)

Cites Work

• The core of an economy with multilateral environmental externalities
• The gamma-core and coalition formation
• On the existence of a cooperative solution for a coalitional game with externalities
• Transfers to sustain dynamic core-theoretic cooperation in international stock pollutant control
• Game theoretic models for climate change negotiations
• Balanced environmental games

Cited In (22)

• Dynamic core-theoretic cooperation in a two-dimensional international environmental model
• International climate agreements under induced technological change
• Catastrophe and cooperation
• The case of two self-enforcing international agreements for environmental protection with asymmetric countries
• Impact of social externalities on the formation of an international environmental agreement: an exploratory analysis
• Environmental agreements, research and technological spillovers
• Can international environmental cooperation be bought: comment
• Simulating the impact of heterogeneity on stability and effectiveness of international environmental agreements
• Social equity in international environmental agreements
• Global refunding and climate change
• Cooperation in dynamic games with asymmetric players: the role of social preferences
• Bargaining over a climate deal: deadline and delay
• Sticks and carrots for the design of international climate agreements with renegotiations
• Modeling and computation of transboundary pollution game based on joint implementation mechanism
• Can partial cooperation between developed and developing countries be stable?
• The effects of R\&D investments in international environmental agreements with asymmetric countries
• Designing stable coalition structures for international environmental agreements
• Do small players undermine cooperation in asymmetric games?
• International environmental agreements with developed and developing countries in a dynamic approach
• Sharing R\&D investments in international environmental agreements with asymmetric countries
• International environmental agreements: coordinated action under foresight
• Understanding human and machine interaction from decision perspective: an empirical study based on the game of Go

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