International environmental agreements with asymmetric countries

DOI10.1007/S10614-010-9197-ZMaRDI QIDQ976996zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Marta Biancardi, Giovanni Villani

Publication date 16 June 2010

Published in Computational Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1007/s10614-010-9197-z

zbMATH Keywords

implementationmonetary transferscoalition stabilityIEA

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Environmental economics (natural resource models, harvesting, pollution, etc.) (91B76)

Recommendations

• Stability of international environmental agreements: an illustration with asymmetrical countries
• The case of two self-enforcing international agreements for environmental protection with asymmetric countries
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• Largest consistent set in international environmental agreements

Cites work

• COALITION FORMATION IN A GLOBAL WARMING GAME: HOW THE DESIGN OF PROTOCOLS AFFECTS THE SUCCESS OF ENVIRONMENTAL TREATY-MAKING
• Climate coalitions in an integrated assessment model
• Dynamic effects on the stability of international environmental agreements
• On the computation of stability in multiple coalition formation games

Cited in

(21)

• Stability of international environmental agreements in leadership model
• The size of farsighted stable coalitions in a game of pollution abatement
• The case of two self-enforcing international agreements for environmental protection with asymmetric countries
• International environmental cooperation: a new eye on the greenhouse gas emissions' control
• Simulating the impact of heterogeneity on stability and effectiveness of international environmental agreements
• Dynamic regularization of self-enforcing international environmental agreement in the game of heterogeneous players
• Stable international environmental agreements: large coalitions that achieve little
• Social equity in international environmental agreements
• Dynamic regularization of self-enforcing international environmental agreement in the game of heterogeneous players
• International environmental agreements under an evolutionary mechanism of imitation and asymmetric countries
• Stability of international environmental agreements: an illustration with asymmetrical countries
• Can international environmental cooperation be bought?
• Largest consistent set in international environmental agreements
• On the stability of a two-player international environmental agreement with intra-industry trade
• The effects of R\&D investments in international environmental agreements with asymmetric countries
• Gradualism in Trade Agreements with Asymmetric Countries
• Social norms for the stability of international enviromental agreements
• Designing stable coalition structures for international environmental agreements
• Sharing R\&D investments in international environmental agreements with asymmetric countries
• International environmental agreements with developed and developing countries in a dynamic approach
• International environmental agreements: coordinated action under foresight

Describes a project that uses

Uses Software

• Maple

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