International environmental agreements with asymmetric countries

DOI10.1007/S10614-010-9197-ZzbMath1231.91369OpenAlexW1988198121MaRDI QIDQ976996

Giovanni Villani, Marta Biancardi

Publication date: 16 June 2010

Published in: Computational Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s10614-010-9197-z

zbMATH Keywords

implementationmonetary transferscoalition stabilityIEA

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Environmental economics (natural resource models, harvesting, pollution, etc.) (91B76)

Related Items (6)

Social norms for the stability of international enviromental agreements ⋮ Sharing R\&D investments in international environmental agreements with asymmetric countries ⋮ Largest consistent set in international environmental agreements ⋮ Simulating the impact of heterogeneity on stability and effectiveness of international environmental agreements ⋮ The effects of R\&D investments in international environmental agreements with asymmetric countries ⋮ THE SIZE OF FARSIGHTED STABLE COALITIONS IN A GAME OF POLLUTION ABATEMENT

Uses Software

• Unnamed Item

Cites Work

• On the computation of stability in multiple coalition formation games
• Climate coalitions in an integrated assessment model
• Dynamic effects on the stability of international environmental agreements
• COALITION FORMATION IN A GLOBAL WARMING GAME: HOW THE DESIGN OF PROTOCOLS AFFECTS THE SUCCESS OF ENVIRONMENTAL TREATY-MAKING

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