International environmental agreements with developed and developing countries in a dynamic approach
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Publication:6550403
DOI10.1111/NRM.12037zbMATH Open1542.91164MaRDI QIDQ6550403FDOQ6550403
Authors: Marta Biancardi, Giovanni Villani 
Publication date: 5 June 2024
Published in: Natural Resource Modeling (Search for Journal in Brave)
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Cites Work
- Sufficient Conditions for the Optimal Control of Nonlinear Systems
- Can international environmental cooperation be bought?
- Dynamic effects on the stability of international environmental agreements
- An infinite-horizon model of dynamic membership of international environmental agreements
- International environmental agreement: A dynamical model of emissions reduction
- COALITION FORMATION IN A GLOBAL WARMING GAME: HOW THE DESIGN OF PROTOCOLS AFFECTS THE SUCCESS OF ENVIRONMENTAL TREATY-MAKING
- Can international environmental cooperation be bought: comment
- The case of two self-enforcing international agreements for environmental protection with asymmetric countries
- International environmental agreements with asymmetric countries
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