International environmental agreements with developed and developing countries in a dynamic approach

DOI10.1111/NRM.12037zbMATH Open1542.91164MaRDI QIDQ6550403FDOQ6550403

Authors: Marta Biancardi, Giovanni Villani 

Publication date: 5 June 2024

Published in: Natural Resource Modeling (Search for Journal in Brave)

zbMATH Keywords

asymmetriestransferscoalition stabilityIEA

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Environmental economics (natural resource models, harvesting, pollution, etc.) (91B76)

Cites Work

• Sufficient Conditions for the Optimal Control of Nonlinear Systems
• Can international environmental cooperation be bought?
• Dynamic effects on the stability of international environmental agreements
• An infinite-horizon model of dynamic membership of international environmental agreements
• International environmental agreement: A dynamical model of emissions reduction
• COALITION FORMATION IN A GLOBAL WARMING GAME: HOW THE DESIGN OF PROTOCOLS AFFECTS THE SUCCESS OF ENVIRONMENTAL TREATY-MAKING
• Can international environmental cooperation be bought: comment
• The case of two self-enforcing international agreements for environmental protection with asymmetric countries
• International environmental agreements with asymmetric countries

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