International environmental agreements with developed and developing countries in a dynamic approach
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Publication:6550403
Recommendations
- International environmental agreements with asymmetric countries
- The effects of R\&D investments in international environmental agreements with asymmetric countries
- Stability of international environmental agreements: an illustration with asymmetrical countries
- Sharing R\&D investments in international environmental agreements with asymmetric countries
- The case of two self-enforcing international agreements for environmental protection with asymmetric countries
Cites work
- An infinite-horizon model of dynamic membership of international environmental agreements
- COALITION FORMATION IN A GLOBAL WARMING GAME: HOW THE DESIGN OF PROTOCOLS AFFECTS THE SUCCESS OF ENVIRONMENTAL TREATY-MAKING
- Can international environmental cooperation be bought: comment
- Can international environmental cooperation be bought?
- Dynamic effects on the stability of international environmental agreements
- International environmental agreement: A dynamical model of emissions reduction
- International environmental agreements with asymmetric countries
- Sufficient Conditions for the Optimal Control of Nonlinear Systems
- The case of two self-enforcing international agreements for environmental protection with asymmetric countries
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