International environmental agreement: A dynamical model of emissions reduction
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Publication:3569476
Recommendations
- International environmental cooperation: a new eye on the greenhouse gas emissions' control
- Stability of international environmental agreements in leadership model
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Cited in
(12)- Cross-country technology transfer and politically driven international agreements for environmental standards
- ENVIRONMENTAL MANAGEMENT POLICY UNDER INTERNATIONAL CARBON LEAKAGE
- Stability of international environmental agreements in leadership model
- International environmental agreements with developed and developing countries in a dynamic approach
- Social norms for the stability of international enviromental agreements
- Sharing R\&D investments in international environmental agreements with asymmetric countries
- The effects of the length of the period of commitment on the size of stable international environmental agreements
- Do voluntary international environmental agreements work?
- International environmental cooperation: a new eye on the greenhouse gas emissions' control
- Sober optimism and the formation of international environmental agreements
- The effects of R\&D investments in international environmental agreements with asymmetric countries
- Editorial: Collaborative environmental management and modelling
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