Evolutionary farsightedness in international environmental agreements
DOI10.1111/ITOR.12019zbMATH Open1290.91129OpenAlexW2040669597MaRDI QIDQ4979986FDOQ4979986
Authors: Michèle Breton, Samar Garrab 
Publication date: 20 June 2014
Published in: International Transactions in Operational Research (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1111/itor.12019
Recommendations
- International environmental agreements: coordinated action under foresight
- The size of farsighted stable coalitions in a game of pollution abatement
- Dynamic effects on the stability of international environmental agreements
- Largest consistent set in international environmental agreements
- An infinite-horizon model of dynamic membership of international environmental agreements
Environmental economics (natural resource models, harvesting, pollution, etc.) (91B76) Evolutionary games (91A22) Dynamic games (91A25) Other game-theoretic models (91A40)
Cites Work
- Evolutionary game dynamics
- Transfers to sustain dynamic core-theoretic cooperation in international stock pollutant control
- Dynamic effects on the stability of international environmental agreements
- An infinite-horizon model of dynamic membership of international environmental agreements
- Stability of international environmental agreements: an illustration with asymmetrical countries
Cited In (10)
- The size of farsighted stable coalitions in a game of pollution abatement
- Time-consistent emission reduction in a dynamic leader-follower game
- International environmental agreement: A dynamical model of emissions reduction
- Self-enforcing international environmental agreements with third-party organizations: initial payment, technological development, and refunding
- Social equity in international environmental agreements
- An infinite-horizon model of dynamic membership of international environmental agreements
- International environmental agreements under an evolutionary mechanism of imitation and asymmetric countries
- Sober optimism and the formation of international environmental agreements
- PARTICIPATION IN INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL AGREEMENTS: THE ROLE OF TIMING AND REGULATION
- Dynamic effects on the stability of international environmental agreements
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