Evolutionary farsightedness in international environmental agreements
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Publication:4979986
DOI10.1111/itor.12019zbMath1290.91129OpenAlexW2040669597MaRDI QIDQ4979986
Publication date: 20 June 2014
Published in: International Transactions in Operational Research (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1111/itor.12019
Other game-theoretic models (91A40) Environmental economics (natural resource models, harvesting, pollution, etc.) (91B76) Dynamic games (91A25) Evolutionary games (91A22)
Related Items (1)
Cites Work
- Transfers to sustain dynamic core-theoretic cooperation in international stock pollutant control
- Dynamic effects on the stability of international environmental agreements
- An infinite-horizon model of dynamic membership of international environmental agreements
- Stability of international environmental agreements: an illustration with asymmetrical countries
- Evolutionary game dynamics
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