Evolutionary farsightedness in international environmental agreements

DOI10.1111/ITOR.12019MaRDI QIDQ4979986zbMATHOpenAlexFDO

Authors Michèle Breton, Samar Garrab

Publication date 20 June 2014

Published in International Transactions in Operational Research (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1111/itor.12019

zbMATH Keywords

dynamic gamesreplicator dynamicsinternational environmental agreements

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Environmental economics (natural resource models, harvesting, pollution, etc.) (91B76) Evolutionary games (91A22) Dynamic games (91A25) Other game-theoretic models (91A40)

Recommendations

• International environmental agreements: coordinated action under foresight
• The size of farsighted stable coalitions in a game of pollution abatement
• Dynamic effects on the stability of international environmental agreements
• Largest consistent set in international environmental agreements
• An infinite-horizon model of dynamic membership of international environmental agreements

Cites work

• An infinite-horizon model of dynamic membership of international environmental agreements
• Dynamic effects on the stability of international environmental agreements
• Evolutionary game dynamics
• Stability of international environmental agreements: an illustration with asymmetrical countries
• Transfers to sustain dynamic core-theoretic cooperation in international stock pollutant control

Cited in

(15)

• International environmental agreements: coordinated action under foresight
• The size of farsighted stable coalitions in a game of pollution abatement
• Social equity in international environmental agreements
• Time-consistent emission reduction in a dynamic leader-follower game
• An infinite-horizon model of dynamic membership of international environmental agreements
• International environmental agreement: A dynamical model of emissions reduction
• Estimating strategic models of international treaty formation
• Dynamic effects on the stability of international environmental agreements
• Sober optimism and the formation of international environmental agreements
• Can justice and fairness enlarge international environmental agreements?
• The impact of foresight in a transboundary pollution game
• International environmental agreements under different evolutionary imitation mechanisms
• Self-enforcing international environmental agreements with third-party organizations: initial payment, technological development, and refunding
• PARTICIPATION IN INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL AGREEMENTS: THE ROLE OF TIMING AND REGULATION
• International environmental agreements under an evolutionary mechanism of imitation and asymmetric countries

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