Time-consistent emission reduction in a dynamic leader-follower game

DOI10.1007/978-0-8176-8089-3_27zbMATH Open1218.91134OpenAlexW2156882551MaRDI QIDQ5198544FDOQ5198544

Authors: Yulia Pavlova 

Publication date: 8 August 2011

Published in: Annals of the International Society of Dynamic Games (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-0-8176-8089-3_27

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Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Environmental economics (natural resource models, harvesting, pollution, etc.) (91B76) Hierarchical games (including Stackelberg games) (91A65)

Cited In (2)

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• A GAME-THEORETIC TREATMENT OF A TIME-DISCRETE EMISSION REDUCTION MODEL

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