A GAME-THEORETIC TREATMENT OF A TIME-DISCRETE EMISSION REDUCTION MODEL

DOI10.1142/S0219198904000058zbMath1114.91022MaRDI QIDQ5315560

Stefan Pickl, Werner Krabs

Publication date: 8 September 2005

Published in: International Game Theory Review (Search for Journal in Brave)

zbMATH Keywords

corecooperative gamedynamic gameKyoto Protocoltechnology-emissions-means-modelcost-game

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Discrete-time games (91A50) Environmental economics (natural resource models, harvesting, pollution, etc.) (91B76) Dynamic games (91A25)

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Cites Work

• An axiomatization of the \(\tau\)-value
• Convex games and feasible sets in control theory
• Capital accumulation of a firm facing an emissions tax
• On some approximately balanced combinatorial cooperative games
• Optimization and nonsmooth analysis
• Game Theory and Cost Allocation Problems