Capital accumulation of a firm facing an emissions tax

DOI10.1007/BF01237243zbMath0855.90034WikidataQ59389909 ScholiaQ59389909MaRDI QIDQ1923972

Peter M. Kort, Richard F. Hartl

Publication date: 3 February 1997

Published in: Journal of Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/bf01237243

zbMATH Keywords

optimal control; capital accumulation; environmental regulation; pollution control; dynamic behavior of a firm; history-dependent equilibria; threshold tax rate

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

91B38: Production theory, theory of the firm

91B62: Economic growth models

91B76: Environmental economics (natural resource models, harvesting, pollution, etc.)

Related Items

A GAME-THEORETIC TREATMENT OF A TIME-DISCRETE EMISSION REDUCTION MODEL, Environmental policy instruments in an international duopoly with feedback investment strategies., Capital-accumulation games under environmental regulation and duopolistic competition, Skiba points in free end-time problems, Multiple equilibria and thresholds due to relative investment costs

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