Capital accumulation of a firm facing an emissions tax

DOI10.1007/BF01237243zbMath0855.90034OpenAlexW1981943654WikidataQ59389909 ScholiaQ59389909MaRDI QIDQ1923972

Peter M. Kort, Richard F. Hartl

Publication date: 3 February 1997

Published in: Journal of Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/bf01237243

zbMATH Keywords

optimal controlcapital accumulationenvironmental regulationpollution controldynamic behavior of a firmhistory-dependent equilibriathreshold tax rate

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Production theory, theory of the firm (91B38) Economic growth models (91B62) Environmental economics (natural resource models, harvesting, pollution, etc.) (91B76)

Related Items (5)

Skiba points in free end-time problems ⋮ A GAME-THEORETIC TREATMENT OF A TIME-DISCRETE EMISSION REDUCTION MODEL ⋮ Multiple equilibria and thresholds due to relative investment costs ⋮ Environmental policy instruments in an international duopoly with feedback investment strategies. ⋮ Capital-accumulation games under environmental regulation and duopolistic competition

Cites Work

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• Optimal dynamic environmental policies of a profit maximizing firm
• Optimization and nonsmooth analysis
• A Dynamic activity analysis for a monopolistic firm
• Optimal Growth with a Convex-Concave Production Function
• Environmental Policy under Oligopoly with Endogenous Market Structure
• Capital accumulation of a firm facing environmental constraints

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