Capital accumulation of a firm facing an emissions tax
DOI10.1007/BF01237243zbMATH Open0855.90034OpenAlexW1981943654WikidataQ59389909 ScholiaQ59389909MaRDI QIDQ1923972FDOQ1923972
Peter M. Kort, Richard F. Hartl
Publication date: 3 February 1997
Published in: Journal of Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/bf01237243
Recommendations
optimal controlcapital accumulationenvironmental regulationpollution controldynamic behavior of a firmhistory-dependent equilibriathreshold tax rate
Environmental economics (natural resource models, harvesting, pollution, etc.) (91B76) Production theory, theory of the firm (91B38) Economic growth models (91B62)
Cites Work
- Optimization and nonsmooth analysis
- Optimal Growth with a Convex-Concave Production Function
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- Environmental Policy under Oligopoly with Endogenous Market Structure
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- A Dynamic activity analysis for a monopolistic firm
- Optimal dynamic environmental policies of a profit maximizing firm
- Capital accumulation of a firm facing environmental constraints
Cited In (7)
- Capital-accumulation games under environmental regulation and duopolistic competition
- Title not available (Why is that?)
- Skiba points in free end-time problems
- A GAME-THEORETIC TREATMENT OF A TIME-DISCRETE EMISSION REDUCTION MODEL
- Environmental policy instruments in an international duopoly with feedback investment strategies.
- Multiple equilibria and thresholds due to relative investment costs
- Title not available (Why is that?)
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