Capital accumulation of a firm facing an emissions tax
From MaRDI portal
Publication:1923972
DOI10.1007/BF01237243zbMath0855.90034WikidataQ59389909 ScholiaQ59389909MaRDI QIDQ1923972
Peter M. Kort, Richard F. Hartl
Publication date: 3 February 1997
Published in: Journal of Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/bf01237243
optimal control; capital accumulation; environmental regulation; pollution control; dynamic behavior of a firm; history-dependent equilibria; threshold tax rate
91B38: Production theory, theory of the firm
91B62: Economic growth models
91B76: Environmental economics (natural resource models, harvesting, pollution, etc.)
Related Items
A GAME-THEORETIC TREATMENT OF A TIME-DISCRETE EMISSION REDUCTION MODEL, Environmental policy instruments in an international duopoly with feedback investment strategies., Capital-accumulation games under environmental regulation and duopolistic competition, Skiba points in free end-time problems, Multiple equilibria and thresholds due to relative investment costs
Cites Work
- Unnamed Item
- Unnamed Item
- Unnamed Item
- Optimal dynamic environmental policies of a profit maximizing firm
- A Dynamic activity analysis for a monopolistic firm
- Optimal Growth with a Convex-Concave Production Function
- Environmental Policy under Oligopoly with Endogenous Market Structure
- Capital accumulation of a firm facing environmental constraints