Environmental Policy under Oligopoly with Endogenous Market Structure
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Publication:4211623
DOI10.2307/3440871zbMath0912.90074OpenAlexW1488601337MaRDI QIDQ4211623
Yannis Katsoulacos, Anastasios Xepapadeas
Publication date: 7 October 1998
Published in: The Scandinavian Journal of Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.2307/3440871
Macroeconomic theory (monetary models, models of taxation) (91B64) Environmental economics (natural resource models, harvesting, pollution, etc.) (91B76)
Related Items (15)
Local content and emission taxes when the number of foreign firms is endogenous ⋮ Emission charge controllability in Cournot duopoly: static and dynamic effects ⋮ Relative emission standard versus tax under oligopoly: the role of free entry ⋮ Environmental taxation and mergers in oligopoly markets with product differentiation ⋮ Capital accumulation of a firm facing an emissions tax ⋮ Managing the tragedy of commons and polluting emissions: a unified view ⋮ Externality control and endogenous market structure under uncertainty: the price vs. quantity dilemma ⋮ Differentiated goods in a dynamic Cournot duopoly with emission charges on output ⋮ STABLE COOPERATION UNDER ENVIRONMENTAL CONSTRAINTS ⋮ On the effectiveness of emission penalties in decentralized supply chains ⋮ Long-run welfare effect of energy conservation regulation ⋮ Green products, market structure, and welfare ⋮ Environmental Policy and Market Structure: A Case of Asymmetric Firms ⋮ Production externalities and investment caps: a welfare analysis under uncertainty ⋮ Capital-accumulation games under environmental regulation and duopolistic competition
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