Environmental taxation and mergers in oligopoly markets with product differentiation

DOI10.1007/S00712-017-0531-YMaRDI QIDQ1650981zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Mahelet G. Fikru, Luis Gautier

Publication date 16 July 2018

Published in Journal of Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1007/s00712-017-0531-y

zbMATH Keywords

carbon taxemission taxend-of-the-pipe abatementmergers and acquisitionsoutput distortionpollution intensity

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Special types of economic markets (including Cournot, Bertrand) (91B54) Macroeconomic theory (monetary models, models of taxation) (91B64) Environmental economics (natural resource models, harvesting, pollution, etc.) (91B76)

Recommendations

• Environmental Policy under Oligopoly with Endogenous Market Structure
• Horizontal merger under strategic tax policy
• Differentiated goods in a dynamic Cournot duopoly with emission charges on output
• Environmental policy and stable collusion: the case of a dynamic polluting oligopoly
• Selective penalization of polluters: an inf-convolution approach

Cites work

• Environmental Policy under Oligopoly with Endogenous Market Structure
• Permits, standards, and technology innovation
• Relative emission standard versus tax under oligopoly: the role of free entry

Cited in

(7)

• Horizontal merger under strategic tax policy
• Employment double dividend hypothesis with the presence of a trade union
• Merger and entry-license tax
• Product Variety, Scale Economies, and Environmental Taxes
• Environmental Policy under Oligopoly with Endogenous Market Structure
• Pollution Taxation and Revenue Recycling under Monopoly Unions
• Economic and environmental impacts of vertical and horizontal competition and integration

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