Selective penalization of polluters: an inf-convolution approach

DOI10.1007/S00199-003-0433-9MaRDI QIDQ1779011zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Ngo Van Long, Antoine Soubeyran

Publication date 20 June 2005

Published in Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://cirano.qc.ca/files/publications/2002s-40.pdf

zbMATH Keywords

Environmental regulationOligopolyPollution

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

(n)-person games, (n>2) (91A06) Environmental economics (natural resource models, harvesting, pollution, etc.) (91B76)

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Cited in

(12)

• Pollution taxes and pollution abatement in an oligopoly supergame
• Taxing pollution in an international duopoly context
• On the multiplicity of efficiency-inducing tax rules
• Environmental taxation and mergers in oligopoly markets with product differentiation
• Extended oligopolies with pollution penalties and rewards
• Apportioning indivisible damage and strategic diffusion of pollution abatement technology
• Taxing pollution: agglomeration and welfare consequences
• Pigouvian taxation under double moral hazard
• Taxes versus Permits in a Two-Stage Duopoly
• Environmental Policy under Oligopoly with Endogenous Market Structure
• Comparative statics for oligopoly: a generalized result
• Voluntary internalisations facing the threat of a pollution tax

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