Pollution taxes and pollution abatement in an oligopoly supergame
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Publication:1267641
DOI10.1006/JEEM.1996.0022zbMATH Open0911.90100OpenAlexW2118629247MaRDI QIDQ1267641FDOQ1267641
Authors: Dick Damania 
Publication date: 1996
Published in: Journal of Environmental Economics and Management (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1006/jeem.1996.0022
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Environmental economics (natural resource models, harvesting, pollution, etc.) (91B76) Multistage and repeated games (91A20) Other game-theoretic models (91A40)
Cited In (11)
- Title not available (Why is that?)
- Environmental R \& D in Cournot oligopoly with emission or performance standards
- Equilibrium pollution taxes in open economies with imperfect competition
- Promotion of green technology under different environmental policies
- Emission taxes vs. financial subsidies in pollution control
- Managing the tragedy of commons and polluting emissions: a unified view
- Environmental policy and stable collusion: the case of a dynamic polluting oligopoly
- Oligopolistic incentives for pollution control with nonzero conjectures
- Pollution Taxation and Revenue Recycling under Monopoly Unions
- Efficiency-inducing policy for polluting oligopolists
- Strategic response to pollution taxes in supply chain networks: dynamic, spatial, and organizational dimensions
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