Environmental R \& D in Cournot oligopoly with emission or performance standards
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Environmental R \& D in Cournot oligopoly with emission or performance standards
Environmental R \& D in Cournot oligopoly with emission or performance standards
Recommendations
- Permits, standards, and technology innovation
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(21)- Pollution taxes and pollution abatement in an oligopoly supergame
- Extended oligopolies with pollution penalties and rewards
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- Permits, standards, and technology innovation
- Dynamic models of pollution penalties and rewards with time delays
- Promotion of green technology under different environmental policies
- ``It's all in the mix! -- Internalizing externalities with R\&D subsidies and environmental liability
- Innovation without magic bullets: stock pollution and R{\&}D sequences
- Relative emission standard versus tax under oligopoly: the role of free entry
- Standard setting with considerations of energy efficiency evolution and market competition
- The monopolistic polluter under environmental liability law: incentives for abatement and R\&D
- Cobb-Douglas preferences and pollution in a bilateral oligopoly market
- R\&D for green technologies in a dynamic oligopoly: Schumpeter, Arrow and inverted-U's
- On the Works of Professor Koji Okuguchi
- The impact of firm-firm externalities on environmental standard
- Abatement strategies and the cost of environmental regulation: emission standards on the European car market
- Strategic environmental corporate social responsibility in a differentiated duopoly market
- Emission charge controllability in Cournot duopoly: static and dynamic effects
- Environmental policy and stable collusion: the case of a dynamic polluting oligopoly
- Incentives for environmental research and development: consumer preferences, competitive pressure and emissions taxation
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