Environmental R \& D in Cournot oligopoly with emission or performance standards
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Publication:3077313
zbMATH Open1224.91024MaRDI QIDQ3077313FDOQ3077313
Authors: K. Okuguchi, F. Szidarovszky 
Publication date: 22 February 2011
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Environmental economics (natural resource models, harvesting, pollution, etc.) (91B76) Production theory, theory of the firm (91B38) Microeconomic theory (price theory and economic markets) (91B24)
Cited In (19)
- Cobb-Douglas preferences and pollution in a bilateral oligopoly market
- On the Works of Professor Koji Okuguchi
- Promotion of green technology under different environmental policies
- Permits, standards, and technology innovation
- Innovation without magic bullets: stock pollution and R{\&}D sequences
- ``It's all in the mix! -- Internalizing externalities with R\&D subsidies and environmental liability
- The monopolistic polluter under environmental liability law: incentives for abatement and R\&D
- The impact of firm-firm externalities on environmental standard
- A note on permits, standards, and technological innovation
- Dynamic models of pollution penalties and rewards with time delays
- R\&D for green technologies in a dynamic oligopoly: Schumpeter, Arrow and inverted-U's
- Environmental policy and stable collusion: the case of a dynamic polluting oligopoly
- Relative emission standard versus tax under oligopoly: the role of free entry
- Emission charge controllability in Cournot duopoly: static and dynamic effects
- Strategic environmental corporate social responsibility in a differentiated duopoly market
- Abatement strategies and the cost of environmental regulation: emission standards on the European car market
- Extended oligopolies with pollution penalties and rewards
- Incentives for environmental research and development: consumer preferences, competitive pressure and emissions taxation
- Standard setting with considerations of energy efficiency evolution and market competition
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