Environmental policy and stable collusion: the case of a dynamic polluting oligopoly
DOI10.1016/J.JEDC.2010.12.003zbMATH Open1209.91119OpenAlexW2006513986MaRDI QIDQ631246FDOQ631246
Authors: Hassan Benchekroun, Amrita Ray Chaudhuri 
Publication date: 22 March 2011
Published in: Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jedc.2010.12.003
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Macroeconomic theory (monetary models, models of taxation) (91B64) Environmental economics (natural resource models, harvesting, pollution, etc.) (91B76)
Cites Work
- Title not available (Why is that?)
- Time-consistent Shapley value allocation of pollution cost reduction
- Transfers to sustain dynamic core-theoretic cooperation in international stock pollutant control
- On merger profitability in a Cournot setting
- Dynamic effects on the stability of international environmental agreements
- Time consistent side payments in a dynamic game of downstream pollution
- SUSTAINABILITY OF COOPERATION OVERTIME IN LINEAR-QUADRATIC DIFFERENTIAL GAMES
Cited In (8)
- Optimal taxation in a common resource oligopoly game
- The monopolistic polluter under environmental liability law: incentives for abatement and R\&D
- Managing the tragedy of commons and polluting emissions: a unified view
- Environmental taxation and mergers in oligopoly markets with product differentiation
- Oligopolistic incentives for pollution control with nonzero conjectures
- Environmental Policy and Market Structure: A Case of Asymmetric Firms
- Differentiated goods in a dynamic Cournot duopoly with emission charges on output
- Efficiency-inducing policy for polluting oligopolists
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