Environmental policy and stable collusion: the case of a dynamic polluting oligopoly

DOI10.1016/J.JEDC.2010.12.003MaRDI QIDQ631246zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Hassan Benchekroun, Amrita Ray Chaudhuri

Publication date 22 March 2011

Published in Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jedc.2010.12.003

zbMATH Keywords

coalition formationdifferential gameoligopolypollution taxcartel formation

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Macroeconomic theory (monetary models, models of taxation) (91B64) Environmental economics (natural resource models, harvesting, pollution, etc.) (91B76)

Recommendations

• Environmental Policy under Oligopoly with Endogenous Market Structure
• Oligopolistic incentives for pollution control with nonzero conjectures
• Extended oligopolies with pollution penalties and rewards
• Environmental R \& D in Cournot oligopoly with emission or performance standards
• Noncompliant oligopolistic firms and marketable pollution permits: Statics and dynamics
• Cobb-Douglas preferences and pollution in a bilateral oligopoly market
• Environmental policies in a Stackelberg differential game
• Pollution taxes and pollution abatement in an oligopoly supergame
• Global environment and dynamic games of environmental policy in an international duopoly
• Stochastic pollution, permits, and merger incentives

Cites work

• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 1734466 (Why is no real title available?)
• Dynamic effects on the stability of international environmental agreements
• On merger profitability in a Cournot setting
• SUSTAINABILITY OF COOPERATION OVERTIME IN LINEAR-QUADRATIC DIFFERENTIAL GAMES
• Time consistent side payments in a dynamic game of downstream pollution
• Time-consistent Shapley value allocation of pollution cost reduction
• Transfers to sustain dynamic core-theoretic cooperation in international stock pollutant control

Cited in

(8)

• Optimal taxation in a common resource oligopoly game
• The monopolistic polluter under environmental liability law: incentives for abatement and R\&D
• Managing the tragedy of commons and polluting emissions: a unified view
• Environmental taxation and mergers in oligopoly markets with product differentiation
• Oligopolistic incentives for pollution control with nonzero conjectures
• Environmental Policy and Market Structure: A Case of Asymmetric Firms
• Differentiated goods in a dynamic Cournot duopoly with emission charges on output
• Efficiency-inducing policy for polluting oligopolists

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