Global environment and dynamic games of environmental policy in an international duopoly
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Publication:2272178
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Cites work
- A dynamic game of a transboundary pollutant with asymmetric players
- Analysis of Nash equilibria in a class of capital accumulation games
- Capital-accumulation games under environmental regulation and duopolistic competition
- Equilibrium pollution taxes in open economies with imperfect competition
- International and Intergenerational Environmental Externalities
- International pollution control: Cooperative versus noncooperative strategies
- Nonlinear strategies in dynamic duopolistic competition with sticky prices
- Pigouvian taxation of energy for flow and stock externalities and strategic, noncompetitive energy pricing
- Pollution control in open economies: implications of within-period interactions for dynamic game equilibrium
- Strategic environmental policy; eco-dumping or a green strategy?
- Trade with polluting nonrenewable resources
- Trade's dynamic solutions to transboundary pollution
Cited in
(23)- Transboundary pollution abatement, emission permits trading and compensation mechanism: a differential game analysis
- Modeling and computation of transboundary pollution game based on joint implementation mechanism
- Domestic and international strategic interactions in environment policy formation
- Environmental policy and stable collusion: the case of a dynamic polluting oligopoly
- Taxing pollution in an international duopoly context
- Environmental policy instruments in an international duopoly with feedback investment strategies.
- Differentiated goods in a dynamic Cournot duopoly with emission charges on output
- Efficiency-inducing policy for polluting oligopolists
- Private vs. public regulation: political economy of the international environment
- The quest for hegemony among countries and global pollution
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 2072566 (Why is no real title available?)
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 824667 (Why is no real title available?)
- Emission charge controllability in Cournot duopoly: static and dynamic effects
- Pollution in strategic multilateral exchange: Taxing emissions or trading on permit markets?
- On coincidence of feedback and global Stackelberg equilibria in a class of differential games
- Local content and emission taxes when the number of foreign firms is endogenous
- R\&D in cleaner technology and international trade
- Pollution control in a Cournot duopoly via taxes or permits
- Capital-accumulation games under environmental regulation and duopolistic competition
- A dynamic multi-objective duopoly game with environmentally concerned firms
- Environmental quality versus economic performance: A dynamic game approach
- Environmental policies in a Stackelberg differential game
- A differential game of international pollution control
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